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The US competed for leadership in space with the Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War.  Losing to the Soviet Sputnik and failing to achieve 
the first manned flight in space hurt US pride and gave credibility to Russian 
missile claims.  Rising to this challenge under the leadership of President 
Kennedy, the nation rallied behind the cause of sending a man to the moon 
and safely returning him to earth, galvanising the might of American civil, 
military, economic and political power to win the Space Race and recapture 
American prestige, technological dominance and leadership in space.  The 
US has nurtured this dominance by extending the military use of space to 
create an asymmetric advantage that remains beyond the reach of any other 
nation.  Leakage of any space-related technology has been smothered by 
regulation and attempts to formalise the governance of activities in space 
through international treaties have been vigorously resisted.  The growing 
hubris of American foreign policy strategy has contributed to resistance to 
American hegemony and challenges to US dominance in space.  Rising great 
powers seek to emulate US military technological dominance in space whilst 
seeking ways to level the playing field.  Confined by regulation to their home 
market, the US space industry has been unable to compete, leaving the non-
US space industry to thrive, challenging the traditional US lead.  Debris, 
proliferation of satellites from a variety of actors and the potential vulnerability 
of US capability from small satellites has contributed to US nervousness.  
Stretched by other pressing national security matters, the true imperative of 
challenges to US dominance in space are not apparent.  Recognition of the 
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CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DOMINANCE 
IN SPACE 
 
In the eyes of the world first in space means first, period; second in space is 
second in everything  
 




 Ronald Reagan succinctly captured the enduring goals and principles 
for American space posture in his Presidential Directive on National Space 
Policy of 1988, declaring that “a fundamental objective guiding United States 
space activities has been, and continues to be, space leadership”2.  
Leadership in space not only confers a military, intelligence and commercial 
advantage, it also bestows prestige.  Exceptionalism forms a deep-seated 
element of the American psyche and the prestige and perceptions on which 
this is built have always been as important as technological capability 
reflected in leadership in space for the US.  Walter McDougall, the winner of 
the 1986 Pulitzer Prize for History with his book The Heavens and the Earth, 
captured the importance of prestige and the perception in the eyes of the 
world of the US as the technologically pre-eminent nation.  This perception is 
not only important for the US psyche but, in the opinion expressed in the 
book, it is also important for maintaining a successful balance of a liberal 
world order.  McDougal claimed that “the security of the United States might 
depend solely on the latter [perception of the US as a technological leader], 
                                            
1 President Lyndon Johnson, quoted in Richard Hirsch and Joseph Trento, The National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, (New York, 1973), p108, cited in Walter A. McDougall, 
The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, (New York, 1985), p320. 
2 Declassified excerpt from NSDD 293, Presidential Directive on National Space Policy, (5 
January 1988). 
2 
but the health of the free-world alliance and the liberal values that cemented it 
depended on continued belief in American dynamism”3 and thus, space has 
played a key role in establishing the technological prestige associated with 
perceived leadership in space.   
 
Space is a burgeoning international arena; there is ever greater 
dependence on the space-based assets that enable the technological 
infrastructure that we take for granted today.  Commercial satellites are 
creating global networks that are critical to international communications, civil 
navigation, weather forecasting and global financial markets.  Space-based 
equipment plays an ever increasing military role in maintaining contact with 
dispersed troops, conducting reconnaissance, navigation and timing and 
providing targeting information for precision-guided weapons4.  Space also 
plays a key role in verifying arms control and non-proliferation treaties.  Given 
this escalating global reliance on space, challenges to space security – 
ranging from military to environmental to legal and criminal – require ever 
greater attention.  Preservation of access to space and the freedom to 
operate in space are critical to many states but particularly to the US.   
 
During the Cold War, the marriage of the rocket and the atomic bomb 
elevated space into the realm of national security.  There were few space-
                                            
3 Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, 
(New York, 1985), p179. 
4 The Royal Air Force Future Air and Space Operational Concept (FASOC) illustrates the 
growing use of satellite communications by highlighting that During Operation DESERT 
STORM a force of 542,000 exploited 99 megabits per second of bandwidth available; during 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM a reduced force of some 350,000 had 3,200 megabits per 
second of bandwidth allocated.  This increased bandwidth allowed unprecedented shared 
awareness, enabled synchronised engagements and allowed operational and tactical 
commanders to implement sophisticated campaign plans. 
 
3 
faring nations and the dominant states (the US and the Soviet Union) evolved 
towards a mutual military restraint backed up by diligent monitoring and the 
development of a series of treaties that helped keep the situation stable and 
space free for each to exploit.  That stable bi-polarity disintegrated with the 
end of the Cold War to be replaced by a uni-polarity dominated by a 
hegemonic US.  Since then, the emergence of additional states possessing 
the capability of launching satellites into orbit has raised new questions and 
posed new challenges about the adequacy of security arrangements, the 
complexity of technological and commercial overlap with the military sector 
and the proliferation of satellites and debris in orbit.  There are various 
schools of thought regarding responses to these challenges to US 
dominance.  Some have suggested new military means as the only realistic 
way of dealing with the challenge others have suggested that political and 
legal mechanisms would be preferable and would avoid the dangers of the 
action and reaction of a security dilemma in space.  The aim of this paper is to 
understand how the US arrived at their position of dominance by tracking their 
journey through the space age, how they responded to the one great 
challenge presented to them by the Soviets and thus won the Space Race.  
Having considered the journey and the one great challenge, this paper will 
consider some of the foreign policy grand strategies that the US has adopted 
with an eye to their impact on US dominance in space.  Finally, a 
consideration of the background to and the implications of the security, 
economic, environmental and legal challenges that the US face in space will 
be explored before concluding.  
4 
CHAPTER 1 
Space Prestige in Context 
Cold wars cannot be won by hotheads.  Nor can ideological conflicts be 
won as crusades or concluded by unconditional surrender. 
 
Walter Lippman (1949)5 
 
The US is the world leader in space technology and its application, 
apart from Russia’s residue of the many Cold War Soviet satellites, the US 
has significantly more satellites in orbit than any other nation or agency with 
some 889 satellites in orbit in 2003.  This is compared with Japan, the next 
highest, with 80 satellites, the European Space Agency with 33 and 
commercial organizations such as Intelsat and Globalstar with 60 and 52 
satellites respectively6.  The US leadership in space was gained in the Space 
Race and has not been relinquished; indeed, the margin of leadership in this 
celestial environment is so significant that it should more accurately be 
labelled space dominance.  To be dominant the US would need to be the 
most important, powerful or influential actor in space and there is little to 
suggest this is not the case7.  The dominance exerted by the US also fits 
neatly with the military description of space superiority which demands “a 
degree of dominance in space of one force over another that permits the 
conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, space and 
special operations forces at a given time and place without the prohibitive 
                                            
5 Walter Lippman, The Russian-American War, (1949), cited in Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms 
and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy, (MIT Press, 2nd 
Edition, 1968), p158. 
6 Tamer A. Mehuron, 2003 Space Almanac, Air Force Magazine, (August 2003), p24, cited in 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of 
Space, (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2004), pp36-37. 
7 Oxford Compact English Dictionary, Second Edition, Revised (2006), p322. 
5 
interference by the opposing force”8.  These definitions certainly fit the current 
US dominance in space which is assumed here and consequently, the term 
dominance is used interchangeably with leadership throughout this paper to 
describe the unrivalled US advantage. 
 
Space – Taken for granted or Prestige Enhancing? 
 
Space has always triggered the imagination and stood as a symbol of 
national technological achievement and ambition.  It has been the backdrop 
for great tales of adventure and exploration from Yuri Gregarin to Neil 
Armstrong and potential future journeys of discovery fuelled by films such as 
Star Wars, television programmes such as ‘Lost in Space’ and the writings of 
authors such as Jules Verne, H. G. Wells, Isaac Asimov and Arthur C. Clarke.  
These stories were the backdrop against which the real saga of the Space 
Age was played out and contributed to the reason why it become such a high-
profile arena for a pivotal Cold War race that represented national virility, 
technical mastery and military dominance; a race that held such prestige that 
the very credibility of two Great Powers was at stake.  Today, space plays an 
increasingly important part in the everyday lives of everyone on the planet.  
Activities we take for granted such as global communications, an international 
banking system (reliant on the US Global Positioning System (GPS)), 
accurate weather forecasting, earth observation available at the click of a 
mouse button at sites such as Google Earth would all be staggering to the 
man on the street merely 50 years ago.  The paradox is that now space-
                                            
8 US Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, (9 August 2002), pGL-6, 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/je/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.  
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based capability has become such an everyday part of the lives of the 
developed world, it may also have lost some of its mystery and romanticism.  
Whilst space-based capability has increased in importance to become a vital 
part of the functioning of everyday life, it has also become a ‘taken-for-
granted’ commodity that has slipped from the limelight in competition with 
other exciting technological and scientific frontiers.  Because of this shift in 
perception, is space still as important a part of national prestige as it once 
was?  Is maintaining capability in space simply on par with the capability of 
other states satisfactory or is it still necessary to be a dominant leader in such 
a crucial environment?  The number of states that now have a space 
capability is growing and the gap between the capability of the US and that of 
their main peer rivals, such as Europe, in satellite communications, and 
China, in space launch, is closing to the point where they may rival and 
challenge the US leadership in space.   
  
 The futuristic novels of Arthur C. Clarke and the remarkably prescient 
writings of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky9 presaged the beginning of the space age 
and the Space Race which arguably began at the end of World War II as the 
Russians and the Americans raced to capture the V-2 rocket technology 
designed and developed by Wernher von Braun and his team in 
Peenemünde.  From the low and slow unmanned, winged cylinder which was 
theVergeltungswaffe-1 (V-1) which the English fighters strained to intercept 
came the invulnerable ballistic V-2 rocket; truly a weapon of terror that left an 
indelible imprint in the mind that is evident today.  The V-2 flew in a long arc, 
                                            
9 Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935) was a Russian scientist and philosopher recognised 
around the world as the founder of the modern theory of space flight with his books: 
Investigations of Outer Space by Rocket Devices (1911) and Aims of Astronauts (1914). 
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high into the stratosphere and descended at three thousand miles per hour, 
faster than the speed of sound and so ensuring a silent arrival.  The roar of its 
flight to the unfortunate destination was heard only after the ton of high 
explosives had detonated, destroying some part of London or other targeted 
city10.  The cost of the V-2 development and of each rocket was far in excess 
of the cost of delivering the same ton of explosives over London by the 
traditional means of bombing raids.  It was a prestigious weapon which 
carried huge psychological impact; it was a weapon of terror.  Rocketry had 
started to have an impact that was more wide-reaching than the actual 
technological achievement.  After the end of WWII, the Space Race heated up 
as the US and the Soviets each strove to develop a rocket to carry a nuclear 
payload, the Race then went into orbit with the launch of Sputnik I in 1957, 
climaxed with the landing of Apollo 11 on the Moon in July 1969, declined 
during détente and left the US as unequivocal leaders in space with the 
talismanic space shuttle capturing the headlines and the Soviet Union 
collapsing in 1991.  Space still carries with it a kudos that bestows a 
technological prestige that belies the every-day nature of many of the 
capabilities it enables. 
 
US Technocratic Exceptionalism 
 
During the Cold War the Space Race and nuclear deterrence tied the 
US to rapid technological change at the same time as the Soviet technocracy 
committed itself to similar changes and particularly to embracing the missile 
                                            
10 During WWII there were 1115 V-2 impacts (517 in Greater London) killing 2854 and 
seriously injuring 6268.  
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revolution.  The Presidential efforts of the parsimonious Eisenhower to rein in 
defence spending, search for a negotiated freeze on arms and the avoidance 
of growing paranoia about the secretive Soviet Union, all played a part in the 
failure of the US to be first into space.  This failure hit hard in the land of the 
Wright brothers where the notion that science was the key to rational progress 
and that, in a form of Social Darwinism, civilization itself evolved at the pace 
of its creation of new knowledge and it was the US that should be leading this 
evolution.  The sense of inferiority after the success of Sputnik I was 
compounded on 6 December 1957 at Cape Canaveral when, 2 seconds after 
ignition, the US Navy Vanguard rocket rose momentarily before thunderously 
exploding in front of the gathered world media.  The US humiliation was 
complete.  Jibes of ‘Kaputnik’, ‘Stayputnik’ and ‘Flopnik’ were tossed around 
and the bitter pill of failure was made even more bitter by ostentatious Soviet 
offers of aid at the UN.  Consequently, the ignominy of the Soviet first had a 
sting that spurred the US on and set the seeds for the US determination to 
recover their position as the world’s technological leader, symbolized by 
leadership in space. 
 
 On 4 October 1957, Lyndon B. Johnson, Senate Majority Leader, was 
strolling around his Texas ranch after dinner following news of the Soviet 
satellite success.  He commented to his guests as he gazed at the stars on 
“the profound shock of realizing that it might be possible for another nation to 
achieve technological superiority over this great country of ours”11.  In history, 
the Romans controlled their world because of their roads, Britain controlled 
                                            
11 Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, 
(New York, 1971), p272. 
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her empire because of maritime power secured by her ships, and the US was 
supreme in aviation; now the Soviets had moved into space.  It was a lead the 
US was not prepared to allow the Soviets to retain.  In their pursuit of the 
prestige associated with leadership in space, there was a tension between the 
US publicly stated aims for space and the shadow military and intelligence 
aims.  The US had proposed through President Eisenhower early in the space 
age that “outer space be used only for peaceful purposes”12, reflecting the 
traditional American idealism and liberal principles.  In adopting this public 
‘open sky’ position, America also encouraged other nations to venture into 
space.  The current US Space Policy proclaims the importance of freedom of 
action in space whilst also retaining the right to “deny, if necessary, 
adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests”13.  
As many other nations seek to reach the level of sophistication of the US in 
space, so they too will step through the various stages of growth to develop 
the sophistication to not only use satellites effectively in space but also 
develop the potential to protect that capability if necessary.   
 
China had its first fumbling adolescent experience of pushing the 
boundaries of its space capability when, on 11 January 2007, it launched an 
anti-satellite missile and destroyed one of its own weather satellites in orbit14.  
The Chinese anti-satellite test sparked discussion on the Chinese motives for 
the test and provided ammunition for the more belligerent US proponents of a 
                                            
12 Letter to from President Eisenhower to Premier Bulganin, 13 January 1958, quoted in 
National Security Council Planning Board, NSC 5814/1, Preliminary US Policy on Outer 
Space, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, (20 June, 1958), p11. 
13 NSPD 49, U.S. National Space Policy, (31 August 2006), p2. 
14 The Fen Yung 1C weather satellite was intercepted and destroyed by a ballistic missile at 
an altitude of some 537miles, fragmenting the satellite into thousands of pieces.  The 
subsequent debris stretches around the earth at altitudes ranging from 200 to 3,800Km. 
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more robust military space posture.  Some analysts have argued that the 
motive for the Chinese test, other than the technological need to prove a 
nascent anti-satellite capability, was the demonstration of a space defence 
capability.  In the absence of space security talks between the US and China 
during its growth as a space nation, Beijing decided it needed to develop a 
“limited defence capability” as a ‘hedge’ policy until some form of collective 
security mechanisms were established15.  The corollary on the US side was 
that the Chinese anti-satellite event spurred greater exploration of a more 
Operationally Responsive Space posture in the US aimed at generating an 
ability to rapidly construct, launch and operate satellites to replace any 
damaged in flight and ensuring continuity of operations16.  The Chinese anti-
satellite test highlighted the growing tension between the US as the 
hegemonic terrestrial and space power and the challenge posed by China as 
an emerging great space power.  It also illustrated the potential for an 
escalatory space security dilemma to emerge.  As China matures its space 
capability and seeks to increase its security, so the US interprets the maturity 
as a corresponding decrease in its own security and so sees a growing 





                                            
15 Dr. James Clay Moltz (Deputy Director, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 
Institute of International Studies), Charting a Course for Improved US Space Security, written 
testimony to the US Congress Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, (23 
May 2007), p4. 
16 MOD, Director of the Air Staff, Strategy Space, in discussion with the author, 18 April 2007. 
17 Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics (Vol. 30, No. 2. 
January 1978), p169. 
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The Space Challenges Faced by the US 
 
The US faces a number of challenges to its leadership in space that 
can be grouped into four distinct areas.  First of all is the proliferation in the 
number of nations with a space capability and in particular the rise of China as 
a space power and the potential for escalation in the weaponization of space.  
Second is the environmental security challenge posed by the increase in the 
number of satellites in orbit and the space debris generated by the 
proliferation of space faring nations and the potential threat it poses to the 
security of US satellites.  The third challenge is the commercial challenge 
posed by a rapidly expanding global space industry for both satellite 
manufacture and for service provision, the overlap of military and commercial 
provision and the dual-use technology employed.  Finally, there remains a 
more general challenge to establish a governance structure to administer the 
activities of space-faring nations.  This latter challenge could encompass 
either a loosely established voluntary ‘rules of the road’ set of principles or the 
generation of more formal legal frameworks - both may constrain the US 
freedom of action in space.  This paper aims to explore these challenges by 
taking a look at path the US followed to gain the leadership in space it enjoys 
today and by considering how America rose to the first and last great 
challenge it faced – the Cold War Space Race.  Armed with an understanding 
of the US space heritage and the response to the Space Race, this paper will 
take a closer look at each of the four general areas in which the US faces 
challenges today.  Finally, the impact of those challenges and the potential 




The Rise of America as the Space Hegemon 
 
We the United States of America can be first.  If we do not expend the 
thought, the effort, and the money required, then another and more 
progressive nation will.  It will dominate space, and it will dominate the world. 
 
James H. Doolittle (1959)18 
 
The US ‘Republic of Technology’ and the Ballistic Missile Debate 
 
Across the western world and particularly in America throughout the 
Cold War and into the present day, technology has been king and this has 
never been more so than in the technology associated with space.  In Francis 
Bacon’s seventeenth century utopia, The New Atlantis, the research scientists 
(merchants of light) took the place of the clergy and the philosopher-king their 
head, the research institute took the place of the church, and the earthly 
utopia that was Bensalem the place of the ethereal heaven19.  Bacon later 
went on to coin the phrase “knowledge is power” and foresaw the emergence 
of human technological influence across all spheres.  Nowhere is this truer 
than in the US which Daniel Boorstin suggested would become noted – some 
would even say notorious – as a land of technology.  Boorstin went on to 
describe how American experimentalism expressed politically in the past as 
American federalism would become generalized today in an expression of 
                                            
18 Cited in the preface to Air Force Manual 6-1, Military Space Doctrine, (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Air Force, 15 October 1982), cited in Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: 
Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, (Frank Cass, London), p86. 
19 Francis Bacon, New Atlantis (1626), The Internet Wiretap edition (1993), 
www.oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/bacon/atlantis.html 
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American technology and would become the leitmotif of the American 
‘Republic of Technology’20.  
 
The true beginning of the association of space with the American 
technological bent can be traced back to when the rocket and the atomic 
bomb were married.  At this point, the combination presented a threat that 
was central to US national security.  The geographic protection afforded by 
the expanse of two great oceans and the providence of having benign 
neighbours no longer offered the security the nation had historically benefited 
from.  The global reach of these new threats put paid to any policy of isolation.  
Freedom from the entangling alliances of the ‘old world’ ceased to be an 
option.  Khrushchev’s claims of Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
capability and extent of the Soviet arsenal which was ahead of American 
capability in the early days of the Cold War generated a clear need for hard 
intelligence on those Soviet capabilities.  This need served to persuade the 
highest officers of government that reconnaissance from space was not a folly 
but of key importance to future US security.  If the promise of intelligence 
delivered from the ‘high ground’ of space was accepted, the need for a 
ballistic missile capability to deliver nuclear warheads across continents was 
not as clear.  This lack of clarity on the requirement for an ICBM capability 
was the result of a number of contributing factors.  In the budget conscious 
period following WWII, the American lead in medium-range bombers based 
close to the Soviet borders and able to strike deep into the heart of the Soviet 
Union detracted from the need to duplicate the means of delivering the US 
                                            
20 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Republic of Technology: Reflections on Our Future Community 
(New York, 1978), pp59-60. 
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nuclear deterrent.  Unable to match the US bomber threat and transcend the 
great distances that insulated North America from the rest of the modern 
world, the Soviet’s felt compelled to concentrate development efforts on 
ICBMs, proclaiming superiority in both technology and in capacity.  The 
argument against using ballistic missiles was powerfully delivered by the US 
Air Force who lobbied hard to protect their manned bomber role.  Yet, in the 
ten year period after WWII, missile technology evolved rapidly.  Improvements 
in Soviet Air Defence also called into question the ability of the US to 
overcome these defences and deliver its nuclear strike from traditional 
bombers.  At the same time, the Soviet ability to launch a first strike using 
ICBMs was becoming ever more credible with the emergence of the much 
smaller hydrogen bomb21.  Ballistic missile technology was at the very cutting-
edge of science and engineering and generated sufficient debate in the US 
between sceptics and enthusiasts to cast doubt over the ability of current or 
forecast rocket technology to deliver a nuclear warhead accurately through 
space to a target 5000 miles away.  The debate continued until 1954 when 
the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee (SMEC) urged in its first report in 
February 1954, that the fastest possible development of a strategic rocket 
programme should be undertaken.  Until this point, the debate only served to 
delay the US start in a fully fledged ballistic missile arms race.   
 
Among the sceptics were some far-sighted and respected scientists; 
one of whom was Vannevar Bush.  A prominent policy maker and public 
intellectual, Bush considered the role of science in the preservation of 
                                            
21 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, (Frank Cass, 
London, 2002), p90. 
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democracy in one of his books published in 1949.  In the book, he expressed 
considerable reservations about the ability to build an accurate ICBM at a 
reasonable cost to achieve a viable military objective claiming that “there is no 
such thing as an ocean-spanning rocket or guided missile capable of precisely 
hitting a target on another continent” and that “there will be no such thing for a 
long time to come …”22.  The scepticism he expressed was more in terms of 
the cost and utility of ICBMs rather than the pure technology.  His scepticism 
was subsequently found to be misplaced, leading him to further defend his 
original thesis in the later edition of his book published in 1968 by claiming 
that, at the time, missile technology did in fact make ICBMs impractical and 
that the use of such missiles was overplayed by the Services in a bid to 
secure appropriations.  Nevertheless, his well argued scepticism was 
balanced by others who held a more optimistic, if qualified, enthusiasm for the 
capabilities of missiles and the utility of space in general.  Among the 
enthusiasts was the Douglas Aircraft Company which published a report in 
May 1946 which would prove to be remarkably prescient.  Whilst recognising 
in the report that “the crystal ball is cloudy”, it uncannily captured the future 
importance of spaceflight in terms of the political, economic and military 
impact of leading in space.  Understanding that whilst “we can see no more 
clearly all the utility and implications of spaceships than the Wright brothers 
could see the fleets of B-29’s bombing Japan and air transports circling the 
globe”, they also recognised that “the achievement of a satellite craft by the 
United States would inflame the imagination of mankind, and would probably 
produce repercussions in the world comparable to the explosion of the atomic 
                                            
22 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men; a Discussion of the Role of Science in 
Preserving Democracy, (MIT Press, 2nd Edition, 1968), p116. 
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bomb”, even going as far as to reflect on the natural urge of man to explore, 
asking “whose imagination is not fired by the possibility of voyaging out 
beyond the limits of our earth, travelling to the Moon, to Venus and Mars?”.  
Within the pragmatic bounding of the vision presented in the report and the 
inspiring possibilities space held, the report anticipated that “the satellite offers 
an observation aircraft which cannot be brought down by an enemy …” and 
that “a satellite offers the possibility of establishing a relay station above the 
earth, through which long-range communications can be maintained …”23.  
Whilst too early to foresee the delivery of nuclear weapons, it was enthusiastic 
and prophetic about the future capabilities of space in general and hinted at 
the potential military uses of missiles for the delivery of weapons between 
continents.  
 
The doubt generated by debate between the space sceptics and the 
space enthusiasts was sufficient to cause the US authorities to hesitate in 
their commitment to space technology and in missiles particularly, despite the 
claims made by Khrushchev on the Soviet missile capability.  The hesitation 
was enough to leave America lagging in the emerging Space Race and the 
military capability it spawned.  The faltering, embryonic development of US 
space capability was arguably perceptual rather than material.  Soviet claims 
have subsequently been found to be exaggerated and US engineering and 
technology at the time was arguably as good as if not better than the Soviet.  
Regardless of the reality of the position, the perception of a Soviet lead in 
                                            
23 Douglas Aircraft Company Ltd, Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling 
Spaceship (Report No. SM-11827, 2 May, 1946), pp1-16. 
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space and missile technology was beginning to take hold and would gather 
pace throughout the 1950s.   
 
Following the Apollo missions in the 1960s and the establishment of 
America as the dominant nation in space, a hiatus ensued.  Approval of the 
US Space Shuttle development in 1972 by President Nixon amid the post-
Apollo space policy chaos was the prelude to a troubled but renewed prestige 
space programme.  Ronald Reagan reflected the consequent successes 
when, on taking office in 1981, he said the Shuttle team had “made us all feel 
like giants again”24.  Despite programme challenges, conflict between NASA 
and Department of Defense (DoD) over cost and requirements and the 
subsequent Challenger disaster in 1986 and the Columbia disaster seven 
years later, the Shuttle has remained the flagship of the US space programme 
and, despite its chequered 30 year history, it will remain one of the great 
achievements of the 20th century.  However, when the remaining Discovery, 
Atlantis and Endeavour spacecraft, their astronauts, crews and mission 
controllers finally cease operations in 2010, the US will be left without an 
imagination-grabbing totem for their space capability. 
 
The rise to unqualified dominance in space is testament to US 
technological pre-eminence.  Exploitation of the capabilities enabled by 
space-based assets by the military and the intelligence services is without 
equal whilst American companies have been at the vanguard of commercial 
exploitation of space.  The US has also been a pivotal influence in the 
                                            
24 Quoted in Craig Covault, Blame it on Nixon, Aviation Weekly & Space Technology, (19 
March, 2007), p84. 
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governance of space as a unique environment, drafting key legal principles 
and, latterly resisting legal and treaty proposals to further govern the conduct 
of actors in space.  The US contribution in each of these areas will be 
considered in more detail. 
 
Military Space Dominance and Vulnerability 
 
 Today, the US military has exploited the advantages of space-based 
capability to become the most technologically sophisticated military in the 
world.  Precision navigation and timing delivered by the constellation of GPS 
Satellites is used to guide cruise missiles and other Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM) accurately to their target.  Hundreds of GPS-guided JDAMs 
were used in the Kosovo war of 1999, more than 5000 JDAMs were employed 
in the Afghanistan war of 2001-02, striking within five meters of the aim point 
and more are being used today25.  The precise timing of GPS is also used to 
synchronise tactical data networks.  Weather satellites provide meteorological 
data for accurate weather forecasting, earth observation reconnaissance 
satellites supply imagery of targets and communications satellites link the 
whole force together to deliver a network-centric capability that is enabled by 
space-based assets.  This space-enabled capability is unmatched by any 
other nation and gives the US military a winning technological edge.  
Technology delivers an undoubted advantage in conventional warfare and to 
an extent in counter-insurgency operations.  It cannot be claimed to be a 
panacea but it is a key part in the particularly demanding operations of today.   
                                            
25 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, 
(1992), pK-41, cited in Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary: Constraining 
the Military Uses of Space, (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2004), p3. 
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That the US has become so reliant on the technology delivered from 
space-based assets has also led to it becoming a potential Achilles heel for 
them.  This was recognised as early as January 2001 when the then 
Secretary of Defense designate, Donald Rumsfeld in the unveiling of the 
report of the Space Commission he had headed, declared that “if the US is to 
avoid a ‘space Pearl Harbour’ it needs to take seriously the possibility of an 
attack on US space systems”26.  An even more contemporary realisation of 
the importance of the space contribution and the risk of becoming too reliant 
on the technology it enables is reflected in the fact that the Israeli Defence 
Force is working on its plan to avoid over reliance on network-centric and 
space-enabled operations27.  A recent RAND report claimed Chinese 
strategists had also concluded that networks “as large and complex as the 
ones the US military uses are … inherently unreliable and open to disruption 
through both hard and soft attacks”28.  The critical importance of space to 
modern warfare is recognised but the security of the space-based assets and 
the supporting infrastructure is often taken for granted.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the recent successful Chinese Anti-satellite test on 11 January 
2007 caused such alarm in Washington.  Indeed, General Mosely, Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, commenting on the event identified it as “a strategically 
dislocating event. This is no different than when the Russians put Sputnik up 
in October 1957” 29.  The vulnerability of the US space capability is certainly 
                                            
26 Jean-Michel Stoullig, Rumsfeld Commission Warns Against “Space Pearl Harbour”, Space 
Daily (11 January, 2001), http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html 
27 David A. Fulghum and Amy Butler, Reassessing Space, Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, (30 April, 2007), p28. 
28 Ibid, p28. 
29 Ibid, p28. 
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hitting home and the recent display of the Chinese anti-satellite capability has 
revealed the potential challenges and the asymmetric advantage that 
attackers enjoy over defenders of space assets.  The proliferation of space 
and anti-space capabilities has US planners increasingly looking toward a 
comprehensive Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and a more operationally 
responsive space posture using constellations of small satellites and quick-
response launchers to replace any lost capability on the one hand and as a 
means of neutralizing an adversary’s satellites on the other.  This emphasis 
was neatly summarized by Major General James Armor, Director of the 
National Security Space Organization in Washington, when he described 
space as no longer the sanctuary it once was and that “any system built that 
is critical to national infrastructure needs to be robust – it cannot be taken out 
by a ‘cheap shot’ such as a terrorist attack on a ground station”30.  Reaction to 
any military challenge to the security and freedom of operation of a US 
satellite would definitely draw a response if attribution could be determined.  
The response would be swift and proportionate but it may not involve the 
denial or destruction of the space-based element of the adversary’s capability.  
The US military, led by the US Air Force, understand space and how to deal 
with the challenges faced in four doctrinal areas: space support, force 
enhancement, space control and force application.  The issues giving rise to 
challenges in each of these four areas will be briefly explored.   
 
A key tenet of space support is space launch.  The imminent end to the 
Space Shuttle programme in 2010 and the limited capacity of the Delta and 
                                            
30 Major General James Armor, Director, National Security Space Organisation, in discussion 
with the author, 12 June 2007. 
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Titan launch rockets restricts US access to space.  This limited fleet is aged, 
less reliable than the US would like to admit and consequently expensive.  
Less costly and more available launch opportunities provided by other nations 
are drawing commercial business away from the US.  Whilst this reduces the 
demand on US launch, it is still not sufficient to meet the demand or reach the 
responsiveness envisaged by the emerging Operationally Responsive Space 
concept.  Furthermore, US commercial satellite manufacturers are reluctant to 
use foreign, particularly Chinese, launches because of US International Traffic 
in Arms (ITAR) regulations.  Elon Musk, a US entrepreneur, is developing the 
Falcon 1 small rocket that may address some of these problems but the lack 
of launch capacity continues to limit the US.   
 
The use of space-based capability across all military and security 
activity to enable communications, navigation, precision timing, meteorology 
and many other functions continues to play an increasingly important role.  
Force enhancement is therefore a key role for space.  The increased demand 
placed on aged existing satellites by the US pursuit of the war on terror and 
the continued entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan using ever more 
sophisticated space-enabled technology is a drain on existing capacity. This 
drain is reducing the availability of US provided space capability to friends and 
allies that have traditionally shared in the dominant US space capability.  
Delay in the acquisition of replacement and new capability (such as proposals 
for space-based radar) is serving to delay any respite in the burden.  Finally, 
budget demands are serving to create a delta between what the US space 
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policy aims to achieve and what it is pragmatically able to deliver, leaving 
room for challengers to close the gap. 
 
Analogous to control of the sea or air, space control encompasses 
those measures necessary to secure freedom of action in space.  The US has 
explored concepts of space control and to ensure their lead is maintained it is 
necessary to develop a ‘hedging’ strategy by ensuring that the US is not 
surpassed, surprised or technologically outdistanced by space control 
capabilities that any other state can achieve31.  Maintaining this lead whilst 
also espousing non-weaponization of space but avoiding limiting its freedom 
of action in space by signing up to formal treaties, such as the Prevention of 
an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a balancing act that will make 
resisting developments in active space control by other states difficult to 
accomplish.  However, weaponization of space is not in the US interest or in 
the interest of any other space-faring nation and so the rational self-interest of 
states and the cooperative good have resulted in a delicate status quo.  
Mitigation against any potential threat by employing smaller more responsive 
and agile satellites to provide much of the capability and, by having more 
satellites available, contributing to a more robust and resilient constellation, is 
one way the US is addressing the challenge.  Coupled with a SSA to increase 
the transparency of activity in space and increase confidence as access to 
space proliferates will all contribute to the maintenance of the status quo.   
However, access to space from an increasing number of states and non-state 
actors will continue to present a greater number of potential threats or 
                                            
31 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of 
Space, (Brookings Institute Press, Washington DC, 2004), p133. 
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opportunities for misinterpretation of action that continue to present the US 
with a space control challenge. 
 
Force application is defined as operations consisting of attacks against 
terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapons systems operating in 
or through space32.  This is the most contentious area of US military space 
doctrine.  A similar conundrum to achieving effective space control, 
exploration of the technology and the ‘art of the possible’ in force 
enhancement should help ameliorate any potential surprises and is a prudent 
measure as an insurance policy to support faith in the promises of other 
nations.  Equally, publicising some of the more ‘exotic’ options of force 
enhancement, such as hypervelocity rod bundles, so-called ‘rods from god’, in 
the Transformational Flight Plan has not helped the US credibility in 
international fora when seeking to deny accusations of weaponizing space33.  
Balancing the two will help avoid any misunderstanding that could potentially 
trigger an ‘arms race in space’ between the US and another ambitious space 
nation as part of a classic security dilemma.   
 
Any race to develop space weapons as part of space control or force 
enhancement will cause two unfortunate sets of consequences.  Militarily, it 
would legitimate a faster arms race – something that can only be detrimental 
to a country that effectively dominates military space activities today.  Second, 
it would reinforce the current prevalent image of a unilateralist US, too quick 
                                            
32 US Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, (9 August 2002), 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/je/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. 
33 The US Transformational Flight Plan, (HQ USAF/XPXC November 2003), 
http://www.af.mil/library/posture/AF_TRANS_FLIGHT_PLAN-2003.pdf, p66. 
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to reach for the gun and impervious to the will of others34.  In sum, the US 
military is the most technologically advanced in the world and much of the 
advantage it enjoys is enabled by its unrivalled space capability.  Born out of 
Wernher von Braun’s ballistic missile technology of WWII, accelerated 
through the Space Race and left leading the world as the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the US military space capability has enjoyed unparalleled success.  
As the number of space-faring nations increases and the US becomes ever 
more stretched, challenges are beginning to emerge.  The ambition of China, 
the proliferation of multinational commercial interests and the increasing 
access to space-based capability by states and sub-state actors means that 
the potential military challenge is extending and deepening.  The US must be 
wary of these challenges but caution against inappropriate signalling that 
could trigger a security dilemma and precipitate an arms race in space. 
 
Commercial and Economic Dominance 
 
 Satellite telecommunications are forecast to continue their prolific 
contribution to global economic growth.  Satellite navigation will be part of 
every mobile phone, car, aeroplane and ship.  It will track every high value 
asset as it moves around the world and it will more than likely grow to be part 
of road user charging, prisoner tagging and emergency services location.  
With such a growing and increasingly global use of space-enabled 
technology, the potential commercial growth in the space industry should be 
very healthy indeed.  It is forecast that the global space industry will rise from 
                                            
34 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of 
Space, (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2004), p121. 
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the estimated $25 billion today to be worth more than $1 trillion by 2020.  This 
projected global expansion is reflected in the UK space industry growth of 
10% per year since 1999/0035. 
 
 The American commercial space industry has been a world leader 
since the beginning of the Space Age.  However, the consolidation of 
aerospace industries in recent times has decreased the flexibility and 
responsiveness of the US space industry during a period of rapid global 
expansion driven by an increase in the number of customers seeking an 
affordable and innovative means of gaining access to space capability.  The 
merger of Lockheed/Martin/Grumman and the merger of 
Boeing/McDonnell/Douglass illustrate the concentration of space technology 
in the hands of a commercial oligopoly matched by a complimentary 
contracting government oligopsony of organisations such as the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the US Air Force and the 
black space programmes of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and 
the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA).  These huge corporations 
and parallel contracting organizations have been criticized, most colourfully by 
US Air Force (Retired) Brigadier General Simon ‘Pete’ Worden who 
characterized the largest trio of US aerospace industry corporations as “the 
three stooges”36.  The US space industry has access to huge resources but 
their colossal size makes them slow to react to the rapid technological 
advances and exploitation trends that emerge, they find it difficult to change 
and adapt to meet these needs and, above all, have deep-seated vested 
                                            
35 UK Space, Case4Space Summary Report, October 2006. p1 and p4. 
36 Quoted by Leonard David, Experts Say Path Beyond Earth Orbit Has its Challenges, Space 
News (29 November 2004), http://www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday_041129.html 
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interests in maintaining a deliberate, well tried strategy to maintain the current 
status quo rather than adopt newer emerging strategies.   
 
The US is protective of its space industry.  It has encouraged and has 
put in place measures to ensure that space technology does not transfer to 
states that could use it to develop a military space capability to challenge the 
US.  The ITAR regulations were put in place to prevent the traffic in Arms 
generally but are particularly stringent where space-related technology is 
concerned.  These regulations have proved so constraining that they have 
served to isolate the US space industry, deny them effective access to global 
markets and encouraged the development of competing markets outside the 
US.  The result is that whilst the US space industry continues to dominate in 
many areas, it is now under increasing pressure from emerging markets and 
is constrained in its response by the ITAR regulations and discouraged by a 
corpulent internal market. 
 
Legal Governance and Political Leadership in Space 
 
 Space has posed two of the overarching international problems of the 
twentieth century: how to contain expensive arms races despite bitter 
competition and distrust, and how to manage the use of non-territorial regions 
like the sea, air, Antarctica, or outer space, within the system of sovereign, 
territorial states.  Containment of the expense of the arms race is beyond the 
scope of this paper and will not be addressed.  The use of non-territorial 
regions continues to stretch the boundaries of the limited number of treaties 
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and international law that have grown to codify the rapid exploration of outer 
space over the past 50 years.   
 
The Space Age spawned inquiry into the fundamental principles that 
should guide the actions of nations outside the Earth.  As technology 
advances and more states and non-state actors have an increasingly valuable 
stake in this celestial environment, the more important cooperation becomes 
but the more difficult agreement is in the tension between a Hobbesian 
struggle for power and dominance and the Kantian desire for an international 
community in space with common universalistic goals.  Codification of the law 
relating to space is still embryonic in its development by comparison to the 
Law of Armed Conflict - even the definition of the boundaries of space 
remains unclear today37.  The core of the jus ad bellum spatialis and the jus in 
bello spatialis can be found in five multilateral treaties that provide the limited 
framework of international law governing the use of force in outer space.   
 
At the heart of these treaties, often referred to as the Magna Carta of 
outer space, is the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies – in common parlance, the Outer Space Treaty38.  
Born out of an unusual degree of cooperation between the US and the 
                                            
37 Defining the boundary between the atmosphere and space has proved particularly 
problematic and has been left undefined in existing space treaties.  The points where land, 
sea and air (essentially solid, liquid and vapour) begin are clearly visible and any areas of 
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such a clearly definable boundary but the need for further clarity has yet to arise – although 
technology is begging more and more questions as hypersonic aircraft and high-altitude 
unpiloted vehicles blur the boundary between traditional air and space vehicles. 
38 United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, (United Nations, New York, 2002), 
pp1-56. 
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Soviets, the Outer Space Treaty proclaims the lofty principle of “peaceful use” 
of space.  Unlike the continents newly discovered by the Europeans from the 
16th to the 19th centuries, “outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation”39.  The “peaceful uses” rubric 
applies to the moon and other celestial bodies but is never defined in the 
treaty and has allowed a generous interpretation that is now generally 
understood to mean the ‘non-aggressive’ use of space.  This has 
accommodated the passive use of military reconnaissance and 
communications satellites that have contributed to greater transparency 
between states leading to a higher level of treaty verification and resultant 
confidence.  The four other treaties deal specifically with some of the 
concepts included in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, such as the rescue of 
astronauts, liability for damage caused by space objects and the registration 
of objects in space.  The two main space protagonists in the drafting of the 
Outer Space Treaty, the US and the Soviet Union, were surprisingly in accord 
with the thrust of the Outer Space Treaty.  Both had witnessed the collateral 
effects of high altitude nuclear explosions during tests.  For example, the US 
Starfish Prime High Altitude nuclear test which took place 400Km above 
Johnson Island in the Pacific on 9 July 1962 generated an Electro Magnetic 
Pulse which not only damaged TV sets in Hawaii 300 miles away but 
damaged seven satellites over a period of seven months and continued to 
affect the Van Allen belts until the 1970s40.  One of the satellite casualties of 
the Starfish test was the first commercial communication satellite ever, the US 
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Telstar.  As a result of the experience of this and other tests, both the Soviet 
Union and the US were determined that there should be no nuclear weapons 
in space to ensure the environment was secure and available for their own 
ends and for future exploitation.  From the US perspective, the Outer Space 
Treaty has been regarded as the offspring of two abiding American 
mentalities.  The first mentality was a Wilsonian emphasis stressing liberalism 
and the rule of law in an attempt to shrink the arena of conflict and mistrust 
between the Superpowers.  The second mentality could be regarded as 
Hoovarian, stressing engineering and material prosperity – unbridled growth 
through access to a new and exciting frontier41.  The experience of the 
Soviets and the Americans was, in part, responsible for the development of 
one of the first space power theories – space as a strategic sanctuary.     
 
As the space age dawned and the Cold War deepened, there was 
tangible concern over how the Soviet Union would react to overflight of its 
territory from space.  The 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation affirmed 
national sovereignty; it also promoted the right of innocent passage but the 
Soviet Union never adhered to it and insisted that “the air space above land is 
as much territory of the state as the land itself” and it is doubtful they would 
have accepted any vertical limitation to that claim.  Such a secretive nation 
would undoubtedly see American satellite reconnaissance as an attack upon 
that closely guarded secrecy and consequently ‘illegal’ and may even have 
construed such an orbital pass as an act of aggression.  This point was 
astutely made in a RAND report in 1950 which suggested that the “Fear of 
                                            
41 Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, p420. 
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loss of secrecy is constant and intense.  A picture of the outside world as 
engaged in penetrating Soviet secrets is likely to be highly anxiety-
provoking”42.  Fear of exposing the empty claims of missile superiority made 
by Khrushchev certainly played a part in the Soviet desire to avoid overflight 
of their territory.   
 
The main vector of disagreement between these two great powers in 
the formulation of the Outer Space Treaty related to the use of space for 
reconnaissance, or spying.  The risks taken to spy on an adversary were 
significant and the shooting down of the US U-2 spy plane over Sverdlovsk on 
1 May 1960 was a prime example.  Flying over hostile territory, each mission 
could be regarded as a hostile act by the Soviets and so required Presidential 
sanction.  President Eisenhower was reported never to have found taking the 
decision to authorise these flights particularly easy and had twice imposed a 
moratorium because of concerns that the missions were too provocative43.  
The impact of the shoot-down of the Gary Powers U-2 on the eve of the long-
awaited superpower summit in Paris could not have been greater.  The 
opportunity to achieve the levels of verification obtained by the U-2 spy 
missions without resorting to such risky means was something that the US 
desired to obtain information on Soviet capability and significantly reduce the 
risk of the Cold War turning hot because of any misperception.    
 
                                            
42 Kecskemeti P, The Satellite Rocket Vehicle: Political and Psychological Problems, (RAND 
RM-567, 4 October 1950), p5, 9 and 10. 
43 Aleksander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, (W. W. Norton & 
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The legality and reaction to overflight of the Soviet Union by a satellite 
was conveniently diffused in October 1957 when Sputnik I was launched into 
orbit.  That the US could have orbited a satellite using the Redstone rocket 
many months earlier had they not tried to be so open and inclusive in the 
International Geophysical Year of 1957 or prevaricated over the legality of 
space overflight was made clear by Secretary Donald Quarles in a meeting 
with President Eisenhower on 8 October 1957.  At the meeting, Secretary 
Quarles declared that “the Redstone, had it been used, could have orbited a 
satellite a year or more ago” but that “it was better to have the earth satellite 
proceed separately from military development.  One reason was to stress the 
peaceful character of the effort; the second was to avoid the inclusion of 
material, to which foreign scientists might be given access”44.   Secretary 
Quarles balanced the loss of prestige involved by highlighting that the 
“Russians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the 
concept of freedom of international space”45.  This was reflected in the Soviet 
retreat from its original position of unlimited vertical sovereignty and the 
acceptance of the ‘freedom of space’.  The argument used to support the 
retreat was sublime in its logic; Sputnik did not violate sovereignty because it 
did not fly over countries below, rather the countries themselves rotated 
beneath the Sputnik!  Regardless of the ‘spin’, space was now considered 
analogous to the high seas, beyond the “effective control” of governments46. 
                                            
44 Even in the early years of the Space Age, the US was fearful of the technology which gave 
them the lead proliferating to other countries.  Often, these other countries were friendly 
nations such as the UK.   
45 “Memorandum of conference with the President” (October 8, 1957, 8:30 AM), DDE Library 
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A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, p258. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Soviet Challenge – How America Responded to Win the Space Race 
 




 The debate over whether to enter a space race with the Soviet Union 
or not was a deeply considered one and it was won not on logic, a need for 
national security, military requirement, technical necessity or commercial 
opportunity but on the American desire to build and safeguard the worldwide 
perception of the American nation as technologically pre-eminent.  The 
political symbolism of the Space Age was neatly captured at a dinner 
following a meeting of the Greenewalt Committee48 on 10 December 1959 by 
the then Vice President Nixon.  He précised the debate that had occurred 
between the ‘space racers’, who were keen to commit to a technological 
space race for prestige, and the ‘science group’ a more conservative group 
who were concerned that any ensuing race would be to the detriment of other 
practical experimentation.  The gathering of ‘outsiders’ that formed the 
committee listened as Nixon described how he recognized that politics had to 
rank higher than science and that space had captured the imagination of the 
world, indicating power and prestige and so trumped the pure science 
argument.  The crushing impact on the American psyche and loss of national 
prestige, which would result if the US did not respond to the challenge thrown 
down by Russia (with the success of Sputnik I) was politically untenable.  
Nixon was sagacious enough to recognize that there might be preferable 
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‘crusades’ to pursue but none were more important than the symbolism of 
space and its potential political impact on the Cold War49.   
 
The Challenge Accepted and the Beginning of the Race to the Moon 
 
So it was that the Space Race was entered, regardless of its merits.  
The decision was sealed with the approval, by President Eisenhower, of NSC-
5918, US Policy on Outer Space on 12 January, 1960.  In that policy, the 
imposing challenge presented by outer space was identified and it was made 
clear that: 
 
There are important scientific, civil, military and political implications for 
the national security, including the psychological impact of outer space 
activities which is of broad significance to national prestige. 
 
Although most opinion considered the US the leader in general technological 
accomplishments, the policy also acknowledged that “the USSR is viewed in 
most quarters as leading in space science and technology” and as a 
consequence even the Soviets’ “baldest propaganda claims are now apt to be 
accepted at face value, not only abroad but in the United States”.  It was 
expected that the US would “catch up” by demonstrably equalling or beating 
the Soviet accomplishments.  Failure to do so would lose the Space Race and 
would give rise to the belief that the United States is “second best,” thus 
transferring to the Soviets additional increments of prestige and credibility now 
enjoyed by the United States.”50 
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Outer Space, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum (17 December, 1959), 
p1 and 2. 
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Such was the public profile of the Space Race that it dominated the 
1960 Presidential election campaign.  It became a metaphor for the 
kaleidoscope of challenges facing the US at home and abroad and was 
captured by each of the candidates.  Kennedy in his speech in Portland, 
Oregon of 7 September 196051 explained how:  
 
The people of the world respect achievement.  For most of the 
twentieth century they admired American science and American 
education, which was second to none.  But they are not at all certain 
about which way the future lies.  The first vehicle in outer space was 
Sputnik, not Vanguard.  The first country to place its national emblem 
on the moon was the Soviet Union, not the United States.  The first 
canine passengers in space who safely returned were named Strelka 
and Belka, not Rover or Fido, or even Checkers.52  
 
Nixon similarly pledged that under his administration, the US would be second 
to none in space53.  The accomplishment of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent Space Race it spawned was the catalyst for the US to revamp 
everything from its Army to its education system to generate the engineers 
necessary to win the race.  Military doctrine was re-written and economic 
possibilities previously undreamed of were opened up.  In peace time, the 
military has to fight for each dollar it spends, justifying the requirement whilst 
the appropriations committees decide the merit of each of the budget 
submissions.  In war, however, a rapid transition occurs.  The dollar loses its 
significance and the focus is on prosecuting the war as quickly and effectively 
as possible to win rapidly and to avoid casualties, damage to the national 
infrastructure and to the economy.  The Space Race was no different to war.  
According to James Webb, the NASA Chief tasked with organizing the 
                                            
51 Cited in Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, pp221-222. 
52 ‘Checkers’ was the name of Nixon’s dog. 
53 Cited in Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, pp221-222. 
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expedition to the moon, the space programme required nothing less than the 
mobilization of the nation to a war footing in peacetime, asserting that whether 
the US liked it or not, they were “in the midst of a crucial and total 
technological contest with the Soviet Union”54.  The dollar lost its tangible 
significance in the race to the moon.  Victory as rapidly as possible, or at least 
more rapidly than the Soviets, was more important to the nation and its sense 
of itself in the Cold War world.   
 
So it was on 25 May 1961 that, the newly elected President Kennedy 
delivered to Congress his special message on urgent national needs.  At the 
end of a long and detailed speech, he famously declared that the United 
States should:  
Commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing 
a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth.  No single space 
project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more 
important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so 
difficult or expensive to accomplish.   
 
The speech not only acted as the catalyst for the US to commit to enter the 
Space Race, it was also a rallying call to all Americans in that “it will not be 
one man going to the moon … it will be an entire nation.  For all of us must 
work to put him there”.  The commitment asked for should be total, there 
should be no half-measures for in the President’s view “If we are to go only 
half way, or reduce our sights in the face of difficulty, in my judgement it would 
be better not to go at all”.  Finally his call to the nation demanded a 
commitment of: 
                                            
54 James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The Large-scale Approach, (McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, New York, 1969), p17. 
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Scientific and technical manpower, material and facilities, and the 
possibility of their diversion from other important activities where they 
are already thinly spread.  It means a degree of dedication, 
organization and discipline which have not always characterized our 
research and development efforts.  It means we cannot afford undue 
work stoppages, inflated costs of material or talent, wasteful 
interagency rivalries, or a high turnover of key personnel. 
 
In short it was a rallying call for a battle of prestige, fought in the full 
knowledge of the heavy costs it would incur but a battle that would have a 
deciding influence on the outcome in a total Cold War55.  
 
The ‘Kennedy Effect’ was just the fillip the nation needed and sparked 
the boom that realised the lunar goal.  Swept along on this tide, the nation 
was encouraged to believe not only that it could send men to the moon but, in 
true American exceptionalism style, they were convinced they could resist 
communist expansion, promote development abroad and reach any goal.  
The Kennedy goal encouraged Congress and the nation to believe that Apollo 
was the space programme.  Once it was over and Apollo had landed, 
Americans began to turn back to furnishing their own self-interest56.  This 
sentiment continued into today as more contemporary goals in space-based 
technology lost their direction and impetus.  Apollo was about going to the 
moon and building whatever technology could get America there; the Space 
Shuttle was a matter of building a technology and going wherever it could take 
America57. 
                                            
55 President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs, 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/Urge
nt+National+Needs+Page+4.htm 
56 Richard S. Lewis, The Kennedy Effect, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1968), pp2-
5. 
57 Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, p423. 
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Realising the Goal and Mobilising the Nation 
 
The technology the US employed to reach the lunar goal set by 
Kennedy has been well documented.  In terms of better understanding how 
the nation was mobilised, a focus on perception and on who piloted the 
Kennedy goal to its conclusion and victory in the Space Race will be the 
emphasis.  The US was in the business of selling an image and it was the 
images that replaced ideals – dishwashers and televisions, consumerism and 
technology were the arsenal of the American assault on the semiotic 
perception of world opinion in the battle of prestige with the Soviet Union and 
in the definition of their own identity.  It is no accident that the US – the most 
technologically advanced nation in the world – was also the most advanced 
nation in advertising.  The US was well armed in the battle of symbolism 
which had become the lingua franca of the technocratic Space Age.  As well 
as being well served in being able to translate and sell the message to the 
nation and the wider world, the US was also blessed with a cohort of decision-
makers in power who would be entrusted with the responsibility for translating 
the goal of sending a man to the moon and safely returning him to Earth into 
reality and realising the prestige it bestowed.  This cohort of powerful men had 
been shaped by their experiences during the totality of WWII.  It is recognized 
that a person’s most influential and formative memories are those they 
experience at first-hand which have major consequences for themselves, their 
career and their nation.  The decision makers in Washington and in the 
embryonic NASA had witnessed the effect of mobilising the state to 
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accelerate advances in science and technology, in transferring that 
technology to industry and in the willingness of the American people to rally to 
a common unifying cause58.   
 
The fact that these lessons had been learned first-hand generated 
disproportionate impressions.  Reading about the lessons of great wars or 
learning from another states’ experience may offer the best lessons but they 
are rarely the most influential or deeply ingrained59.  It has been persuasively 
argued that the influence of major contemporary wars on learning have a 
much greater salience.  It has also been demonstrated that the longer the 
event dominated the political climate, the wider the ruling age-band is and the 
greater the impact.  The two World Wars influenced later beliefs not only 
because they were highly salient but because they held attention over many 
years.  The lessons thus became deeply embedded, and successive groups 
learned the same beliefs.  So it was that a whole generation of decision 
makers in the US administration of the 1960s had undergone a common, first-
hand experience during WWII which provided a shared formative reference 
point that was to prove a unifying bond that they used to great effect in 
mobilising the American nation60.  The perceptual predisposition to rally 
behind a cause and the practical confidence to trust in the ability of science 
and technology to rise to the occasion, the power of industry to meet 
                                            
58 For instance, Robert McNamara the US Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968 took his 
experience of studying the efficiency of General Curtis Le May’s B-29s to the Ford Motor 
Company where he became one of the “Whizz kids” who used his formative military 
experience to supervise the regeneration of the company. 
59 The US paid scant regard to the crippling losses experienced by British unescorted daylight 
bombers during the WWII until the Americans themselves began similar unescorted daylight 
bombing raids and attracted comparable losses. Only then was the need for fighter escort 
was accepted.  
60 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton University 
Press, 1976), pp216-287. 
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demanding timescales and rapidly rising capacity all contributed to the 
translation of President Kennedy’s vision and goal being turned into reality.  
The salience and impact of the momentous experiences that the War had on 
these men of action was a notable ingredient in the launching and eventual 
success of America in winning the Space Race.  The country and these men, 
from all shades of the political spectrum, had a new unifying cause to rally 
behind and they unambiguously embraced the battle identified by Kennedy – 
it was a battle of prestige in a race for the moon. 
 
The Soviet Experience and Mr Khrushchev’s Boomerang 
 
 What did the Soviets gain from the Space Race?  Certainly Sputnik 1 
presented Khrushchev with a propaganda coup demonstrating the apparent 
technological and economic superiority of the Soviet system but it also 
reinforced the claim (later proved not to be true) that Moscow had an ICBM 
capability and significant numbers of them.  The credibility given to Soviet 
missile claims by the achievements embodied in Sputnik I was recognised in 
NSC 5918/1 which identified that 
From the political and psychological standpoint the most significant 
factor of Soviet space accomplishments is that they have produced 
new credibility for Soviet statements and claims61.  
 
The secrecy of the work of Korolev62 allowed Khrushchev to take the plaudits 
as the leading inspiration behind the Soviet leap into space.  The spectacular 
                                            
61 National Aeronautics and Space Council NSC 5918/1, Draft Statement of US Policy on 
Outer Space, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum (17 December, 1959), 
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space ‘firsts’ also served to enhance the image Khrushchev wanted to foster 
of himself as a dynamic leader.  The rewards garnered in the international 
boasting that followed the success of Sputnik I would not be easily 
surrendered.  The subsequent Lunik launch reinforced the perceived lead that 
the Soviets peddled and spurred President Eisenhower to consider competing 
with the Soviets on grounds of national prestige.  Three years after Sputnik I, 
the US was still perceived to be lagging behind.  The perception of Soviet 
technological might was further heightened in April 1961 with the launch of 
Yuri Gregarin into orbit on Korolev’s powerful and majestic Vostok I rocket.   
Although the US achieved a sub-orbital trajectory three weeks later, it did 
nothing to close the apparent gap that existed in the eyes of the world.  In 
actuality, the Americans were leading the Soviets in every meaningful 
category of missile technology but despite this the perception to the contrary 
persisted because of the high profile propaganda achievements gained by the 
Soviets.   
 
John Foster Dulles was one of the first to realise that the prestigious 
gains from Sputnik and its successors would return to haunt the Soviets and 
become “Mr Khrushchev’s boomerang”63.  Indeed he proved to be correct.  
The discontinuous jolt that Sputnik provided to the US put into stark contrast 
the prospect of being perceived as also-rans in space and was sufficient to 
shock the US into a technological and economic frenzy that ultimately left the 
Soviets ‘in a spin’.  If Eisenhower was guilty of underestimating the 
importance of Sputnik, Khrushchev was equally guilty of overestimating its 
                                            
63 Quoted in Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, p295. 
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importance.  Where the US was able to use the first satellite as a catalyst to 
energise a nation, the Soviets were not able to use it as a similar catalyst for a 
system resistant to change and a command economy unable to match the 
agility and dynamism of the western liberal capitalist model.  The first space 
challenge posed by the Soviet Sputnik  was won not in space but in the will of 
the US to be the ‘shining beacon on a hill’, demonstrating to the Soviets and 
to the world, the virility and dominance of the American way.   
 
Reagan’s Space Race 
 
As a footnote to the account of the first challenge to American 
technocracy, the gauntlet of the second challenge between the US and the 
Soviet Union was laid down by the Americans.  President Reagan emulated 
Kennedy by calling for a further space race in the 1980s as a means of 
breaking the Soviet ability to match the dynamism and energy of the US 
technical capability, again focused on space.  For the first time in 1981, 
military space budgets surpassed those of NASA and Reagan’s Strategic 
Defence Initiative (SDI) was at the source of this increase.  SDI, dubbed “Star 
Wars”, had exotic plans for space-based missile defence which shattered the 
brittle doctrine of space as a sanctuary and triggered a global debate on the 
impact on deterrence and the concept of assured destruction.  The Reagan 
initiative was successful in accelerating the Space Race to such a degree that 
the Soviet system was unable to keep pace and eventually faced defeat.  This 
was exactly what Reagan was aiming for, asserting that “capitalism had given 
us a powerful weapon in our battle against Communism – money.  The 
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Russians could never win the arms race; we could outspend them forever.”64  
So it was that on these two occasions that it was the sense of exceptionalism, 
high ideals and economic might that saw the US through to victory.   
                                            
64 Reagan, An American Life, p267, in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (Oxford 
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CHAPTER 4 
US Grand Strategic Approaches 
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the 
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone. 
 
President George W. Bush65 
 
The US has emerged from the Cold War and the parallel Space Race 
as the dominant nation militarily, economically and technologically.  It was 
also, by some margin, the most dominant nation in space.  From 1989 to 
2001, American policymakers searched for the rationale to focus the country’s 
role in the absence of any single unambiguous challenge that might be the 
hub of a new grand strategy, both generally and in space.  The terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 brought this hiatus to an abrupt and shocking 
end and provided a definite focus for American national security.  In addition, 
the mass murder and political intimidation of the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon served to put in context the potential 
spectrum of asymmetric threat that the US space capability might face by a 
sub-state actor that wanted to reduce the US technical superiority.  First, the 
scale and sophistication of the 9/11 attacks and the disregard for the loss of 
life suggests there would be no hesitation to use Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) if they were available to terrorists.  Second, the 
willingness to sacrifice their own lives in the attack calls into question the 
precepts of deterrence.  With the scope of threat so extensive, no option 
should be dismissed.  One such outlandish event would be a high altitude 
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nuclear detonation which would have the potential of bringing the 
technologically dependant US and much of the developed world to a stand-
still.  Whilst such a scenario is not expected, nor is it proposed that it has 
been the catalyst for American actions, the intent could be envisaged, even if 
the capability does not yet exist.  Whilst such a potential threat should not be 
dismissed, it is the more tangible and pressing challenge to American security 
posed by terrorism that capture the attention.  It is the subsequent events in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the intelligence effort in the so-called ‘global war on 
terror’ that have been the focus of American military and security activity.  
This security activity has drawn on the technologies enabled by space-based 
assets more than ever; reinforcing the importance that space plays in 
American military capability.  Coupled with the security efforts, the 
characterisation of nations as “evil” and the goal of fostering democracy 
throughout the Middle East have exhibited a hubris that has served to 
galvanize a resentment and in some cases, opposition to American 
hegemonic power66.   
 
US Strategic Realism 
 
Before considering the emerging challenges that the dominant US 
faces in space, it is helpful to reflect on the US strategic approach to provide 
some context against which the challenges can be better appreciated.  The 
grand strategies considered are general in nature but are applied here with a 
strong view towards American attitudes and policies in space.  Attentive to the 
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importance of power and the centrality of military force, the US has displayed 
many realist tendencies.  The impotence of the UN to address many recent 
international crises has generated such a lack of confidence in the 
organization that, in effect, there is an absence of any credible central 
authority above the level of the state.  This contemporary neorealist vacuum 
has left the world looking to the US to fill the gap at a time when the US feels 
more threatened and is looking to disengage from regional security 
alignments.  Whilst still dominant across virtually all spheres, the over-
commitment of the US and its desire to disengage has left the way open for a 
degree of economic balancing in the space industry and the rise to near 
technological parity in space by the likes of Europe and China.  As a response 
to the unipolarity of pax Americana, a multilateral, liberal internationalist tide is 
rising in opposition to US dominance, particularly in space.  The increasing 
reliance on global governance to address common issues, such as the 
creation of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Treaty on global 
warning is spreading to the space arena with repeated proposals at the UN 
Conference on Disarmament for a Treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race 
in Outer Space (PAROS).  Such multilateralism, particularly where space is 
concerned, seem to carry a thread of altruism that is seductive but when 
viewed against the national self-interest of many of the states proposing this 




                                            
67 For example, the Chinese ASAT test of 11 January 2007 would have contravened the spirit 
if not the letter of the PAROS Treaty repeatedly supported by China.   
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US Grand Strategy – The Rise to Primacy 
 
With these contextual descriptions established, what would best 
describe the US grand strategy?  A definition of the term grand strategy that 
captures its main elements describes it as the means by which “a country will 
employ the various tools it possesses – military, economic, political, 
technological, ideological and cultural – to protect its overall security, values 
and national interests”68.  Many grand strategies have been postulated but a 
look at four previously described visions of US grand strategy comprising neo-
isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative strategy and primacy will 
provide the framework here69.   
 
The desire for neo-isolationism is apparent in the growing calls for 
disengagement and the lack of any rational, all-embracing challenge to US 
dominance.  However, the events of 9/11, the integrated nature of the global 
economy and the worldwide impact of environmental issues all detract from 
this as a viable strategy.  Furthermore, the disengagement of the US from the 
global stage would create a vacuum that would likely precipitate greater 
competition and offer more opportunities for space proliferation.   
 
A strategy of selective engagement would serve to concentrate power 
with an assortment of states that would form a wedge of interest to deter 
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others has some merit.  Given the many competing demands on US 
resources, this strategy offers the opportunity of spreading the burden among 
a group of allies that would provide a stabilising balance and powerful 
alignment.  Whether US prestige could bear the dilution of reputation and 
consequent loss of influence across other related spheres by sharing power is 
questionable.  Nor does this strategy chime with the US propensity to want to 
determine its own focus for foreign policy or act as the ‘shining beacon on a 
hill’.  The US is a natural leader, generally and in all things related to space, a 
strategy of selective engagement would require it to cede this leadership, not 
something the US is inclined to do.   
 
Cooperative engagement has some attractive elements too but lacks 
the independence and romance of a grand strategy that would appeal to the 
sense of US exceptionalism.  Neo-isolationism and selective engagement 
have their roots in the realist school.  The strategy of cooperative 
engagement, by contrast, has its roots in the liberalist school.  Collective 
action among democratic nations using international institutions where 
possible is seen as the way to deter aggression and the challenges of such 
collective security are ameliorated by the lesser demands of cooperative 
security.  The growing number and influence of democratic states cooperating 
within established international institutions would leave remaining ‘rogue’ 
states isolated and prone to intimidation by the collective influence of the 
coalition.  Whilst seductive, this liberal approach is vulnerable to a range of 
criticism some of which was alluded to earlier.  Expectations that nations 
would rise above narrow conceptions of national self-interest on behalf of the 
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collective good has always been a weakness of cooperative approaches.  
Whilst this remains the case, space has often proved to be an environment 
where both the collective good and national self-interest have been 
synonymous.  For example, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) agreed debris mitigation guidelines which have served to 
slow the growth of debris in space, lessening the risk of damage from debris 
and benefiting all space-faring nations70.  However, building sufficient 
multilateral agreement on other important space-related issues, such as 
weaponization of space, has not been achievable, even among partners who 
are close in many other respects.  For example Europe has insisted on an 
independent alternative to GPS, the Galileo precision navigation and timing 
constellation.  This has caused friction with the US not least because of the 
potential frequency confliction of the Galileo system with the secure ‘M’ code 
of GPS.  Europe is also looking to further its own economic self-interest by 
generating revenue from the potential down-stream services from Galileo71.  
Despite many areas of cooperation, a more formal strategy of cooperative 
security remains elusive and far from an aspiration of the US72.   
 
Finally, the grand strategy of primacy is considered.  Arguably, the US 
has not only been primus inter pares but primus solus since the end of the 
Cold War, not only preserving peace among the major powers but securing 
supremacy economically, militarily and technologically.  Such dominance 
across all spheres has prevented the emergence of any rival and has been 
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72 Major General James Armor, Director, National Security Space Organisation, in discussion 
with the author, 12 June 2007. 
49 
the focus of recent US strategy73.  In addition the US has exerted significant 
“soft power”, dominating mass culture, news media, film and television74.  
Though committed to the maintenance of overwhelming power and influence, 
the US also remains strongly committed to liberal principles, assuming the 
role of a benign hegemon.   To sustain this primacy requires the US to pursue 
a level of qualitative superiority over all potential challengers to discourage 
competition.  Whilst this was feasible prior to 9/11, the subsequent national 
security imperatives have stretched even the resources of the US and the 
budgets are no longer available to meet the goals of space leadership stated 
in the latest 2006 Space Policy75.  In addition, the quest for primacy faces a 
number of other challenges.   Some states will not wish to remain in a 
permanent position of subordination to the US, for many reasons not least of 
which will be national pride, and nor will an open liberal economy serve to 
encourage such subordination.  The arrogance of an insistence on hegemonic 
primacy by the US can in itself engender resistance.  The US has 
demonstrated willingness for preparatory self-defence that has stretched to 
pre-emption in an attempt to thwart rising challengers, particularly ones that 
may have access to WMD.  This latter point was certainly evident in the so-
called ‘Bush Doctrine’ captured in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the 
United States, declaring that “America will act against such emerging threats 
before they are fully formed”76.  For the first time it proclaimed the national 
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security objectives which included: preemptive military action against hostile 
states and terrorist groups seeking to develop WMD, an unwillingness to allow 
its global military strength to be challenged by any hostile power and, in 
contrast to the primacy emphasis of the previous two statements, it did 
express a commitment to multilateral international cooperation.  The main 
thrust was one of primacy and the ambition it contained reflects the final 
critique of a strategy of primacy; namely the dangers of imperial overstretch.  
Robert Jervis cautioned against this, warning that “avoiding this imperial 
temptation will be the greatest challenge that the United States faces”77.  
Whilst the US seems in many ways ideally endowed, economically, militarily 
and politically, to run a benign liberal empire, in practice it has not found it 
easy.  Such imperial undertakings are often short-lived and their results 
ephemeral78. 
 
Anti-American Backlash  
   
The US has followed a general strategy of global primacy as a benign 
hegemon and it has been successful and drawn considerable admiration.  
However, whilst on this path, the US has also drawn opprobrium and 
resentment.  A striking example of these contradictions is to be found in the 
actions of one of the most influential Sunni Islam clerics; the Qatar-based 
Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi.  Widely condemning the US in the media, 
comparing US actions in Iraq with the invading Mongols of 1258 who sacked 
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the city of Baghdad and slaughtered the inhabitants, al-Qaradawi has been a 
colourful and outspoken critic of us foreign policy and culture.  Such 
outspoken dislike of the US, however, is not matched by a principled personal 
conviction.  He sent his daughter to the University of Texas for a graduate 
degree in biology, his son for a doctorate at the University of Central Florida 
and another son for an MBA degree at the American University of Cairo79.  
The contradiction is, however, indicative of the ‘love-hate’ relationship the US 
experiences.  The demand for ‘global governance’ is outstretching even the 
prodigious capacity of the US.  Such contrasting and contradictory views of 
the US are not uncommon.  In addition, the US preponderance across all 
spheres has fostered a view which attributes the US with omnipotence and 
omniscience.  As a consequence, the US is often blamed for events in the 
world as if they were planned or willed by Washington80.  The National 
Security Strategy of 2002 has its critics81 whilst others have provided a more 
positive analysis82 but the strategy, right or wrong, was one deemed best for 
the US at the time.  Whether the demands of primacy have overstretched the 
US generally is open to debate, whether this overstretch and concern over 
threats has led to the emergence of challenges in space is even less certain.  
Indicators of balancing by states are beginning to emerge with China 
committing to serious increases in defence spending (particularly in space) 
and there is also evidence of the creation of new alliances – generally as well 
as in space.  In a world where the demand for ‘global governance’ greatly 
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exceeds the supply, it is the US that the world continues to turn to.  Whether it 
can or has the will to continue to meet these calls remains to be seen.  
Whether it sees or has the capacity to meet the challenges to its space 
dominance is related and will determine whether the US retains its leadership 
in space or cedes it.   
 
These grand strategies provide the context against which the US space 
challenge should be viewed.  The American desire to act as the ‘beacon on 
the hill’, living in a society driving technology relentlessly forward is revealed 
in the hubris of the strategy of primacy.  As in the modern mythology of 
George Orwell’s 1984 or Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, total dominance 
has frequently resulted in total power that, even if benignly intended, ends up 
becoming the undoing of the society83.  It is not to suggest that the US 
primacy is quite as overwhelming as these modern fictional examples but the 
lesson of overstretch and a system that attempts to wield too much power is 
evident and is one that the US should pay heed to. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Challenges to American Leadership and Dominance in Space 
It’s nice to say we can do it unilaterally, except you can’t 
Secretary of State Colin Powell84 
 
 Over the 50 years of spaceflight, much of the superpower competition 
of the Cold War has given way to international cooperation among a growing 
number of space-faring nations.  The merger of the US and Soviet space 
programmes into the International Space Station is a wonderful example of 
cooperation on one of the most outstanding engineering achievements of the 
space age.  Cooperation is also evident in commercial spaceflight with 
multinational corporations investing billions of dollars in communications 
satellites of staggering capacity.  This cooperation is to be welcomed but it 
remains a veneer over the anarchic world of state security.  In reality, the 
need to secure the advantages accrued from the high ground of space will 
continue to play a significant part in the security of any sovereign state.   
 
 In response to the Soviet challenge to US technocratic dominance at 
the heart of the Space Race, public opinion and support played an important 
part in delivering the nation’s space aims.  Public support for cooperative 
space ventures has continued to play an important part in selling the 
expenditure and commitment to space.  In the background the real 
expenditure and commitment to the classified and secretive military and 
intelligence space programmes takes place deep within the Department of 
                                            
84 Secretary of State Colin Powell to President George W. Bush, quoted in Bob Woodward, 
Bush at War, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002), p333. 
54 
Defense and other even more opaque organizations, far from public scrutiny.  
The aim of many of these programmes is far from the public stance of 
increased cooperation.  Whilst it would be disingenuous to suggest that there 
was any lack of faith on the part of the US administration in their stated desire 
for cooperation in space in pursuit of dearly held values of freedom, 
exploration, discovery and the peaceful use of the new frontier in space, the 
duality of the parallel classified space programme does sit uncomfortably with 
this cooperative view.  National prestige, the need for reconnaissance and for 
verification of activity deep inside Soviet borders presented an inescapable 
reality that required a response.  Rather than bowing to the singular real 
challenge and responding in military kind, the US strove to pursue the twin 
approaches of ‘space for peace’ in the public propaganda campaign whilst 
also engaging in the realpolitik requirement to defeat their Cold War rival in 
this new and pivotal environment of space through military dominance.  In 
doing so, the US paid a heavy bureaucratic and economic price by having the 
civil NASA programme designing national prestige projects and in its shadow 
running the military programmes in ICBMs, missile defence, in surveillance 
and in reconnaissance.  The benefit accrued in this posture was a global 
moral dominance that served them well at the time.  Whether this will continue 
to be the case is a moot point. 
 
The US faces a number of challenges.  Some are acute, demanding 
immediate responses; others are more obtuse and require delicate handling 
over a protracted period.  The rise of China as the dominant peer rival is the 
most obvious challenge the US faces.  The associated rise in the economic, 
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technical and commercial challenges to US dominance in the space industry 
is less apparent but of national importance to Washington.  The final 
challenge is wrapped up in how space should be governed and administered.  
The two opposing views on space governance comprise the paradoxical 
liberal institutional view of Russia and China who have advocated further 
treaties and formal legal frameworks at the UN Conference on Disarmament 
or the US proclivity for more realist, less formal ‘rules of the road’ to govern 
activity in space.   
 
There are other challenges than those faced in space that the 
American nation should be concerned with.  Those other challenges which 
are capturing the political headlines such as the so-called ‘global war on 
terror’ and emerging challenges to do with climate change are important but 
without the technology furnished from the American lead in space, many of 
these other challenges would become even more difficult to tackle by an order 
of magnitude.  The space challenges faced by the US from China, from 
commercial competition and from the management and governance of the 
space environment, will be considered in turn and some of the impact and 
potential responses considered.   
 
Space Power Challengers 
 
The challenges to US dominance in space come from a variety of 
states.  The number of space-faring nations is growing rapidly.  Forty four 
states have accessed space independently or with the launch services of 
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others85 and states with their own space capability now numbers around 
seven86.  The commercial sector is also growing rapidly but whilst now vast, it 
remains diffuse in terms of a direct challenge to US national capability.  The 
most direct challenge from other states come from Europe (regarded as a 
state in this instance), Russia, India and, most pointedly, China. 
 
Some have argued that Europe will soon emerge as a counterbalance 
to the US dominance in space.  Europe has been a significant space power 
for a number of years and claims to have 40% of the commercial markets for 
satellite manufacturing launch and satellite services87.  Clearly presenting a 
commercial challenge, Europe represents less of a security challenge. 
Despite the European Commission unveiling a plan to spend more than $5 
Billion on “Security and Space” programmes between 2006 and 201388, it 
currently lacks unity in its security policy and the shared political institutions, 
differences among the member nations and competing budgetary priorities 
generally preclude any significant security challenge emerging89.  Whilst 
Europe has a rapidly growing space sector and has ambitions to extend the 
capability it has developed in its civil applications into the security sphere, the 
liberal democratic principles shared by Europe and the US suggest any 
military conflict is highly unlikely.  Consequently, the European security 
challenge will not be considered further here.  Russia still retains a 
                                            
85 Spacesecurity.org, Space Security 2006, (Canada, July 2006), p16. 
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considerable space capability and should not be dismissed as a security 
challenge to US dominance in space; its inventory of rockets, vestiges of the 
Soviet ICBM arsenal, remains significant and is turning out to be a valuable 
source of revenue after their conversion into commercial launch vehicles.  US 
cooperation and engagement with Russia in space programmes has 
increased and so has reduced the potential misinterpretation of intentions 
typical of a security dilemma and so diminished the challenge posed.  The US 
motives for this increased cooperation may be less than pure liberal altruism; 
for example, it is argued that the merging of the US and Russian manned 
space programmes towards cooperation on the International Space Station 
was largely motivated by the US desire to keep Russian rocket and missile 
engineers employed and off the international space job market thereby 
avoiding a migration of missile expertise to other states with missile 
ambitions90.  Nevertheless, the cooperation and associated dialogue is 
beneficial and has led to greater transparency and trust between these two 
old Cold War nations91.  The two most rapidly advancing space-faring nations 
to emerge as potential challengers to US dominance are India and China.  
The Indian President, Abdul Kalam, was among his country’s space pioneers, 
helping to build and launch the continent’s first rockets.  Having such a space 
enthusiast at the Head of Government has certainly helped the Indian space 
programme blossom.  Even with the ever-present tensions with Pakistan, the 
Indian space objective remains focused on the delivery of civil services such 
                                            
90 Joan Johnson-Freese, Strategic Communication with China: What Message about Space?, 
China Security (Issue Number 2, 2006), p45. 
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58 
as education, telemedicine and weather forecasting to its vast and remote 
population.  India is definitely a rising space power with significant capability 
but one that is not at the top of the list of states which presents the clearest 
challenge to the US dominance in space and so will not be considered in any 
further depth in this paper.   
 
The Chinese Challenge 
 
Fifty years after Sputnik and the start of the original Space Race 
between the US and the Soviet Union, China is the one undertaking rapid and 
ambitious new developments in rocketry, satellite communications and space-
defence and presents the clearest challenge to US dominance in space today.  
China recently joined Russia and the US as the only space powers with 
demonstrated manned spaceflight capabilities.  In some of the futuristic US 
space war games, it is a nominal rising great power and near-peer space 
competitor, which could easily be taken for China, which occupies centre 
stage92.  Played out on the fault lines that provide the context for real-world 
astropolitik, the US space war games focus on the US dependency on space 
assets both military and commercial and the recognition of the potential 
Achilles heel that this represents.  The Games also factor in the globalization 
of commercial space services by multinational corporations operating partially 
outside the traditional jurisdiction of sovereign states and combine to generate 
the potential flash-points between the US and the near-peer, oriental rival.  
The unmistakable escalation of China as such a prominent space challenger 
                                            
92 MOD, Director of the Air Staff, Strategy Space, in discussion with the author, 18 April 2007. 
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is testament to the progress China has made in its space programme over the 
last half-century.  Ironically, the rocket - ‘firing arrow’ in Chinese – was 
invented in China by Feng Jishen in 970 and its earliest recorded use in 
warfare dates back to the Song dynasty in their fight with Xia in 108393.  The 
genesis of the modern Chinese space programme can be traced back to its 
first director, a brilliant graduate of California Institute of Technology – Tsien 
Hsue-shen.     
 
Graduating from CalTech in 1939, Tsien and five fellow students began 
to experiment with rocketry and their exploits quickly came to the attention of 
the US military.  Tsien was also quick to gain considerable academic respect 
for his work, becoming CalTech’s assistant professor of aeronautics in 1943.  
His commercial prowess was not found wanting either.  He co-founded the 
highly successful Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and in May 1945 he was 
awarded the rank of Colonel in the US Air Force and sent to Germany to 
assess the Nazi V-2 rocketry of Wernher Von Braun.  However, at the height 
of the McCarthy purges in 1951, Tsien was accused of being a communist, 
his security clearance revoked and he was arrested.  In 1955 he was 
deported to China.  The US loss was definitely a Chinese gain.  Tsien’s talent 
was quickly recognised and in October 1956 Tsien became the first Director 
of the Chinese defence ministry’s Number 5 Research Industry – the Chinese 
Space Programme. 
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From this US-endowed modern genesis, the Chinese space capability 
has made remarkable progress particularly when set against the attempted 
isolation of the Chinese space programme by the leading space-faring nation, 
the US.  Whilst it may be convenient to assume that Chinese space 
technology has been acquired through ‘beg, steal and borrow’ methods, it is 
not entirely an accurate reflection.  It is true that China has developed its 
space capabilities by ‘borrowing’ generic designs from others (predominantly 
through the proliferation chain emanating from Russia) but it has also 
engaged in a number of successful cooperative programmes with countries 
such as Canada; Russia and Brazil94.  The indigenous technological 
development has built on these foundations to the extent that China is now 
able to offer a keen commercial launch alternative to the traditional cartel of 
US, European and Russian launch providers.  China has sold satellites to 
nations such as Nigeria and although the US engagement with China on 
space has been limited in the extreme, China has advanced technologically 
and has formed a number of significant strategic space partnerships95.     
 
The US ban on exporting any space-related technology to China since 
1999 has been matched by a refusal to have any meaningful dialogue 
whether through international forum or bilaterally.  This isolation of China’s 
space programme has fostered the belief in China that the US seeks to arrest 
its progress in space in order to thwart the Chinese ability to revolutionize its 
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warfighting technologies and win on the high-tech battlefield of the future96.  A 
‘dialogue of the deaf’ has resulted in both sides talking past each other.  In the 
absence of any meaningful dialogue, the US continues to try and extract 
information about the co-mingled Chinese civil and military space 
programmes from under the shroud of opacity that typifies the Chinese 
cultural anathema to transparency.  Correspondingly, the Chinese remain 
reluctant to trust a schizophrenic US that proclaims loud denial of any plans to 
deploy space weapons whilst publishing concepts and doctrine to the 
contrary97 and refusing to enter into any formal agreement banning weapons 
in space.  The US position is further undermined through the continued 
commitment to its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability.  The capability 
inherent in the exo-atmospheric interception of a ballistic missile is the same 
as that of a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon and continues to thwart US 
protestations about not wanting to weaponize space.    
 
The challenge facing the US from the rising Chinese space capability is 
not so much the rising space capability itself but avoiding the potential for the 
intentions of each side to be misinterpreted in a pernicious security dilemma 
which would become the source of increased tensions between a nervous 
hegemon wary of challengers to its critically important space asymmetry, and 
the ambitions of a rising great power suspicious of the intentions of foreign 
states.  Support for this hypothesis can be found in the cultural foundation of 
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Chinese strategic thinking.  In China, the Great Wall is not merely a symbol of 
the many glorious accomplishments of China’s ancient civilization; it also 
epitomizes, for many scholars, the Chinese Confucian preference for conflict 
aversion and defensive-mindedness.  This cultural defensiveness is matched 
by a realpolitik outlook which favours military solutions and is offence-
orientated.   This combination has been labelled the “Chinese Cult of 
Defence”98 and has some particularly alarming connotations for signalling in 
the potential space security dilemma.  One prominent Chinese military scholar 
claims that virtually all of the wars that China has fought in more than four 
thousand years of dynasties have been civil wars or wars to unify the country, 
and that all eight “military actions” since 1949 have been waged in “self-
defense”99.  This peculiarly active form of self-defence is illustrated in the 
rationale used for the attack on Vietnam in 1979 which was labelled by Beijing 
as a “self-defensive counterattack”.  A similar logic of calibrated force in self-
defence was applied to China’s intervention in Korea in October 1950, to the 
various clashes in the Taiwan Strait, to its brief but bloody border war with 
India in 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1969 – all of which were labelled 
“self-defence counterattacks”100.   
 
Such aggressive interpretations of a defensive posture are not without 
precedent.  The line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is not 
going to be drawn at the point of imminent attack but at a point of sufficient 
threat.  This vague interpretation of pre-emption should have three 
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rudimentary underpinnings to fall within the Just War tradition.  First, there 
should be a manifest intent to injure, second there should be a degree of 
active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger and, finally, a 
situation should exist where waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, 
would greatly magnify the risk101.  The Israeli Six Day War is cited as an 
example of a Just pre-emptive strike; whether the Chinese strikes in Vietnam 
and Korea would be regarded as Just is open to question.  What the Chinese 
interpretation does illustrate is a very expansive interpretation of ‘defence’ that 
would justify the initiation of an early and decisive first strike if it believed its 
security was threatened.  When such an active construal of ‘defence’ is 
coupled with a heightened sense of threat that China’s political and military 
leaders are prone to, the challenge from China’s growing space capability 
takes on a very different hue102.  Couple this with the US propensity for 
preemptive attacks in their strategy of primacy and the potential for 
misunderstanding and subsequent action is clear.  China’s strategic behaviour 
is influenced not just by the realpolitik strand but also a Confucian one.  The 
combined effect has been dubbed the ‘Chinese cult of defense’ in which 
realist behaviour dominates but is justified as defensive on the basis of a 
pacifist self-perception103.  With this background, the recent Chinese anti-
satellite test and the potential for China to use that capability as a first strike 
option to deny the US the asymmetric advantage they enjoy in space, makes 
US nervousness understandable.  Consequently, the security challenge the 
US faces from a rapidly advancing Chinese space and missile capability is not 
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only manifest in the technological competence and hardware that China is fast 
developing but also in managing the perception and potential misperception of 
US intentions in space. 
 
The Chinese cultural propensity for using calibrated force and its 
tendency to perceive threats is not helped by US hyperbole and hypocrisy.  
That the Chinese flew sensitive military equipment on the Shenzhou V 
manned space mission is entirely probable, however for the US to go one 
step further and extrapolate that “future Chinese manned space stations 
planned for the next decade could perform defensive and offensive military-
space missions”104 appears to be no more than pious indignation.  This is 
particularly so when viewed against the generally accepted knowledge that 
the US Space Shuttle cargo bay dimensions were dictated by the Pentagon to 
ensure intelligence payloads could be carried.  Such US hyperbole can 
appear to be disingenuous from a Chinese perspective.   
 
While the US may see itself as Han Solo or Obi-Wan Kenobi, much of 
the rest of the world, including China, hears the voice of Darth Vader when 
the US speaks of its plans in space105.  If ‘star wars’ are to be avoided, clearer 
signalling of the intentions of both sides is necessary.  That can only be 
achieved by increased openness and dialogue. 
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Commercial and Economic Challenges 
 
 The US ITAR regulations were designed to halt the transfer of militarily 
relevant technology to other nations through the restriction of technological 
exports.  The ITAR regulations have become entrenched, complex and 
bureaucratic and are having a particularly harsh impact on the 
competitiveness of the US space industry by restricting US markets and 
allowing competitors room to flourish.  For example, the UK space industry 
has found that the many export restrictions applied to relatively benign US 
technology, such as the honeycombed aluminium used to build satellites, are 
so difficult and time-consuming to overcome that US sourced material is rarely 
even considered106.  Indeed, the ITAR restrictions have become so 
constraining that the UK space industry, along with other nations, has turned 
wherever possible to non-ITAR restricted markets to source components and 
associated technology and expertise.  Some in the European space industry 
have even taken to advertising ‘ITAR-free’ satellites.  Alcatel is reported to 
have won a recent contract to supply the Chinasat 9 direct broadcast 
television satellite on the basis of being able to offer an “ITAR free” 
solution107.  This strategy of sourcing components and technology that are not 
bound by the stultifying ITAR bureaucracy was originally more costly in terms 
of the time taken to source the components and their availability.  Over time, 
the demand for non-ITAR components has generated a flourishing space 
industrial base outside the US which has developed to the point that it is now 
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able to compete directly with the US giants in the space industry.  The new 
markets are most evident in Europe where, alongside the traditional space 
industry, a growing number of small niche companies have blossomed.   
 
The UK, which is by no means a large player in space, has an industry 
with a turnover of £5.2 billion, contributing around £2.4 billion to UK GDP in 
2004/05 and employing 17,560 people, predominantly graduates108.  This 
growing UK space industry is developing a business model which is 
increasingly turning to Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) components rather 
than the space qualified components traditionally used in the US.  The 
rationale being that the quality required to meet the reliability demanded of 
COTS products today, with production runs of millions of units, is proving to 
be more dependable than the so-called high-reliability components which are 
produced in small numbers to bespoke specifications.  The combined effect of 
an ITAR restricted US export market and the growth in mobile technology that 
has direct applications in space for the growing non-US space industry, is 
escalating commercial and economic competition to challenge the US 
leadership109.  Freed from the suffocating competition of the large US 
companies, an alternative space industry is fast emerging.  Whilst the ITAR 
restrictions have undoubtedly limited the transfer of US technology, the 
availability of affordable, high capacity and reliable COTS technology, married 
to innovative satellite construction processes using common platforms, is a 
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business model that is being repeated globally with countries such as India, 
Brazil and China who are all marching ahead with space-related technologies 
developed by indigenous companies.   
 
The US has been aware of the alternative model adopted by many of 
the European space companies but has so far not been sufficiently nimble to 
follow, nor has it had any incentive to do so.  The US space industry is 
dominated by very large corporations with long-established processes and 
cultures that would be difficult to change to the more flexible and innovative 
model that is emerging in Europe.  Such a change would also reduce their 
ability to compete for and launch the large, very lucrative, complicated and 
very capable satellites used by the US government.  The impact of the 
growing, non-ITAR restricted competition described is not solely concentrated 
on manufacturing.  The service sector and, in particular, the US technical 
expertise and the intangible competences gained through years of experience 
in the space industry are not immune to the tangling ITAR restrictions.  The 
Intelsat use of Chinese launch vehicles provides a very good case which 
illustrates the reach of ITAR restrictions. 
 
 On 15 February 1996 a Long March 3B rocket carrying the US-built 
Intelsat 708 crashed shortly after blasting off from the Xichang launch centre 
in China. It was the third such launch failure in a little over three years; each 
of the failed launches carried a US-built satellite payload.  Such launch 
failures are still not uncommon in isolation but three from the same Long 
March series of rockets drew the attention of the international space launch 
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insurance industry.  Following an initial investigation by the Chinese state-
controlled launch provider, The China Great Wall Industry Corporation, 
representatives of the space insurance industry insisted on an independent 
review.  The subsequent investigation of the launch failures was conducted by 
an Independent Review Committee comprising Western aerospace engineers 
from the manufacturer of the satellite, Loral, and other specialists drawn from 
companies including Hughes Space and Communications, Daimler-Benz 
Aerospace and some retired experts from Intelsat, British Aerospace and 
General Dynamics110.  The Independent Review Committee report agreed 
with the initial Chinese investigation but also identified a further two possible 
causes of the failure and recommended tests be conducted to prove or 
disprove each scenario.  Following these tests, the Chinese authorities were 
able to confirm that the cause of the failures was indeed one of the additional 
scenarios proposed by the Independent Review Committee.  This example of 
multinational space cooperation, involving the nascent Chinese commercial 
space launch industry and the established Western industry, would help move 
forward the reliability of the Chinese space launch capability to the benefit of 
all concerned.   
 
The advent of a reliable Chinese space launch capability increases the 
international launch capacity and reduces the cost of launch to the space 
industry111.  This benefit was as a direct consequence of the diagnosis of the 
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Independent Review Committee into the Long March rocket failures.  The 
increased reliability also had the effect of reducing insurance premiums on 
Chinese commercial launches.  The cooperation evident in the US led multi-
national International Review Committee was a model cooperation that should 
have been applauded.  The cooperation also reflected the sentiments of the 
Clinton Administration’s US Space Policy which was being drafted as the 
Committee sat and contained an aim to pursue “greater levels of partnership 
and cooperation in national and international space activities”112.    
 
It seemed everyone had benefited.  However, a chance reading of the 
launch failure investigation in Space News by a Defense Technology Security 
Administration (DTSA) official, Robert Kovac, triggered a major inquiry which 
led to the threat of criminal prosecution for Loral and a House of 
Representatives Select Committee inquiry (the Cox report) into the whole 
affair.  At the heart of the issue was the fact that the Independent Review 
Committee had exposed the state owned Chinese space industry to Western 
diagnostic processes which could lead to improvements in reliability for all 
Chinese missile and rocket programmes – including the military variants of the 
Long March rocket.  The impact claimed by the DTSA was disputed by the 
CIA in the Cox Report.  The CIA reported to the State Department that “the 
Independent Review Committee report did not disclose any significant missile-
related technology or know-how to the PRC’s ballistic missile program.”113 
Much of the information related in the report was claimed to be in the public 
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domain but even this was not sufficient to excuse the transgression.  As an 
example, the Cox Report related, passing a foreign national an article from 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica would not require an export licence.  If the 
article was passed by an engineer in the context of specific technical 
discussions, a defence service would have been provided and an export 
licence required114.  The Loral case raised a number of sensitive issues for 
the US, has been the subject of lengthy and detailed investigations and has 
served to deter US companies from dealing with any foreign space 
organization out of fear of subsequent prosecution.   
 
It is clear that the information contained in the International Review 
Committee Report and the exchanges made during meetings could aid the 
Chinese development of the ICBM missile, relatives of the Long March 
commercial launch rocket115.  The findings of the Cox Report also illustrated 
that the dual use of technology is becoming widespread and increasingly 
difficult to differentiate.  Combined with the restrictions on the use of 
information in the public domain described, it is not surprising that many US 
companies are now highly reticent to release any information relating to space 
capabilities at all without first going through the very slow, cumbersome and 
bureaucratic release procedures.  This has had a number of effects.  Many 
US companies are finding it increasingly difficult to find non-US partners to 
collaborate with or are not seeking any collaboration at all to avoid tying up a 
project in ITAR bureaucracy.  US companies are also reticent to seek 
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overseas contracts for fear of not being able to meet their contractual 
deadlines because of the quagmire of ITAR regulation they would have to 
wade through.  Loral Space and Communications have been trying for six 
years to receive US government approval to deliver the Chinasat 8 satellite 
without success – the satellite remains in storage at Loral’s Palo Alto plant116.  
Furthermore, it has become increasingly difficult to acquire indemnity on the 
international insurance market for ITAR-related launches.  Denied information 
on the technology used in the construction of the satellite, insurers have 
become reticent, without full disclosure, to insure US ITAR-related launches 
or have significantly increased their premiums – further reducing the 
competitiveness of the US space industry.  One final, unintended 
consequence of the stringent US export restrictions and the consequent 
contraction of the US space industry is that the number of engineers and 
scientists working on space related projects is also declining.  This factor may 
take some time to correct.  
 
Despite these difficulties, US companies such as Northrop Grumman 
and Boeing, still have large Government space programmes to fall back on.  
But with a US economy entering difficult times, this comfortable cushion may 
not last much longer as the patience of government is being tested by over-
budget, delayed programmes such as the Space Based Infra Red (SBIRS) 
programme which has taken a decade to develop and has tripled in cost from 
its early estimates to $11 billion117.  This has led to increased scrutiny of the 
US space industry and the way in which contracts are let.  The US 
                                            
116 Peter B. de Selding, US Export Restrictions Help Alcatel Win Chinasat 9, Space News (21 
June 2004). 
117 Amy Butler, Turning Heads, Aviation Week & Space Technology, (16 April, 2007), p36. 
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Government is becoming agitated by such profligacy.  Given the freedom to 
develop without the smothering competition of the large US firms, who have 
been tied down, Gulliver style, by a myriad of ITAR limitations, the competition 
for affordable, responsive and innovative space technology from the non-US 
industry is growing rapidly.  Companies such as Surrey Satellite Technology 
Limited (SSTL) in the UK – recognised as world leaders in small satellite 
technology – offer affordable access to technologically proven, innovative 
space capability.  The US market has been starved of Schumpetarian style 
competition by the arcane ITAR restrictions and as a result, the US space 
industry has merged into a few giant leviathans that are unable to match the 
agility and creativity of the emerging global space market.  The US still retains 
technological leadership in the very specialized US government market for 
high resolution earth observation satellites and other technically demanding 
intelligence related applications.  It is beginning to lose market share of the 
less technologically demanding but more affordable space capability offered 
by many non-US companies and the capability offered by some small 
satellites is also beginning to encroach on the traditional US military and 
intelligence capabilities.   
 
If it was the aim of the ITAR regime to ensure the US retained a 
technological lead by restricting the proliferation of their technology it is 
succeeding, to a degree.  But, in attempting to corral its technology, it has 
spurred the non-US space industry to evolve an alternative model which is 
proving increasingly relevant to space capability and is providing affordable 
access to space for more states and non-state actors.  The US technology is 
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largely isolated and is limited by an ITAR anchor which prevents free access 
to global space markets.  The ITAR regime has been referred to by a senior 
US space official as a “child eater” and the many attempts at change have 
failed due to vested interests in the US Senate118.   Overcoming the strangling 
effects of ITAR is a major challenge for the US space industry.  The Centre for 
Nonproliferation Studies and the Space Policy Institute of George Washington 
University declared at the end of an international seminar on Space Conflict or 
Space Cooperation that “most participants cited current US export control 
restrictions as a major impediment and urged reform of the ITAR 
regulations”119.   
 
The US could take a lesson from Isaac Asimov’s Foundation trilogy, in 
which he implied that the best way to secure the dominance of the 
Foundation’s technology was not to guard it but to make it widely available, 
creating a dependency that can be controlled rather than stimulating a 
competing capability.  In discussions between the Europe based Symphonie 
communications satellite consortium and Washington in 1963 to provide a 
launcher for the new satellite, the US limitations were so constraining120 that it 
convinced Europe of the need to develop its own launch capability which 
would eventually compete directly with the US launches121.  The ITAR 
regulations and the US nervousness about technology transfer in general 
                                            
118 Senior Pentagon official in discussion with the author, summer 2007. 
119 James Clay Moltz, Space Conflict or Space Cooperation? 26 January 2006, 
http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060126.htm  
120 Concerned that Symphonie and other European satellite communication endeavours might 
jeopardize their control over Intelsat, the US placed stringent conditions on the launch, 
insisting that any satcom be project remain experimental and be limited to Europe. 
121 Michael A. Taverna and Frank Morring Jr, Space Odyssey, Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, (19 March, 2007), p88. 
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seem to be creating the antithesis of their intention.  Freed from the 
dominating market presence of the US space industry giants, innovative and 
affordable space technology has proliferated around the world providing 
access to space capability to many of the nations the US was seeking to 
disadvantage. 
 
The Space Governance Challenge 
 
The single most influential space treaty, the 1967 UN Outer Space 
Treaty, has survived the test of time.  Whilst such precedent is encouraging, 
the hope that the Outer Space Treaty and its subordinate treaties may 
continue to be adhered to is not a basis upon which to base national security.  
China and Russia have repeatedly proposed a further treaty at the UN 
Conference on Disarmament, the perennial PAROS.  The US has consistently 
argued that such additional legislation is not necessary, that the 1967 UN 
Space Treaty is sufficient and has stood the test of time, and that the US 
preference is to deal on a bilateral or multilateral basis with other space-faring 
nations122.  This policy was made clear in October 2005 when, after many 
years of abstention, for the first time the US cast the only ‘no’ vote (160 
countries voted ‘yes’ and Israel abstained) on the annual vote on the need for 
a PAROS Treaty.  The position was further entrenched in the 2006 National 
Space Policy which stated that  
 
                                            
122 Major General James Armor, Director, National Security Space Organisation, in discussion 
with the author, 12 June 2007. 
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The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or 
other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of 
space123.   
 
This was a discernable shift from the previous National Space Policy of the 
Clinton Administration in 1996 which stated that  
 
The United States will consider and, as appropriate, formulate policy 
positions on arms control and related measures governing activities in 
space, and will conclude agreements on such measures only if they 
are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the 
United States and our allies124.   
 
The shift away from the liberal institutionalism of relying on the UN and legal 
means of managing space to a more realist perspective and the reliance of 
power and alliances to secure US leadership is much more resonant with the 
more recent neo-conservative US posture than the traditional US liberalism in 
space espoused by the likes of Eisenhower.  The current more realist posture 
of primacy will also leave the US open to accusations of securing space as 
the 51st state of the United States rather than the final frontier of 
exploration125.  Managing space and the legal frameworks that govern its use 
as more and more nations join the space club will continue to be another 




In 2000 Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) launched a 1Kg nano-
satellite called the Surrey Nanosatellite Applications Platform 1 (SNAP-1) as a 
                                            
123 US National Space Policy, 31 August 2006, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/ostp_space_policy06.pdf 
124 Office of the Press Secretary. PDD/NSC-49 (PDD/NSTC-8). National Space Policy, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, (File: 18242 “Clinton Space 1996”), 19 September 1996, p13. 
125 Bronwen Maddox, America Wants it all – Life, The Universe and Everything, The Times, 
19 October 2006. 
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piggy-back payload on a Russian Cosmos launch.  With a micro propulsion 
system, three-axis attitude determination and control, GPS orbit determination 
and on-board computing and communications, SNAP-1 was able, moments 
after separation from the rocket, to take an image of the classified Russian 
satellite that it accompanied into space and transmit the image back to Earth. 
The impact of SNAP-1 created considerable consternation in Russia, 
prompting a number of alarmist protestations.  SNAP-1 was launched to 
demonstrate the technology for remote sensing and formation flying missions 
as part of a broader concept comprising a swarm of satellites.  The 
basketball-sized SNAP-1 then went on to attempt a rendezvous with a 
Chinese satellite.  Over a number of days, SNAP-1 manoeuvred in orbit, using 
its innovative propulsion system126, to position itself within close enough 
proximity of the Chinese satellite to demonstrate how a small, difficult to 
observe, low cost micro-satellite could conduct an in-orbit rendezvous.  The 
COTS technology used, married with innovative propulsion solutions and 
rapid construction processes demonstrated the accessibility and affordability 
of space technology and the potential utility of such small satellites.  Such 
technology is available today to any Customer with something in the region of 
£1M to spend and whilst its employment can be entirely peaceful – such as in-
orbit inspection of satellites – similar micro satellites could also be employed 
in more covert, offensive roles.  Fears of micro-satellites such as SNAP-1 
being exploited as an anti-satellite weapon to destroy or disable much larger, 
expensive and difficult to replace satellites in orbit has generated considerable 
                                            
126 Regulations demand that pressure vessels for fuels, regardless of their size, have to 
undergo an expensive and time-consuming testing programme to gain certification before 
launch.  The fuel pipes which take the fuel from the vessel to the propulsion unit do not have 
to undergo such certification.  Consequently, SNAP-1 used a short piece of coiled fuel pipe to 
hold the small amount of fuel it needed to manoeuvre and overcame the need for certification. 
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nervousness, particularly in the US.  The need for a SSA capability of 
sufficient fidelity to identify objects in orbit that could pose a threat has 
become the key foundation of US developments and future plans in space127. 
 
The impact of SNAP-1 was also to accelerate research into the use of 
small satellites as ‘Angels’ to protect, service and possibly repair satellites in 
orbit.  The same concept could also be used to create ‘Demons’, able to 
covertly approach the satellite of an adversary and disrupt their operation or 
even destroy them.  Such scenarios seem far-fetched but as SNAP-1 
demonstrated; they are very much of the here and now.  Such capabilities are 
of increasing interest to many nations and represent a growing potential threat 
to the major space powers that have some very valuable, critically important 
earth observation and monitoring satellites in vulnerable low earth orbits.  Any 
satellite that can manoeuvre has the potential to be used as a weapon, if that 
satellite is sufficiently small it becomes difficult to detect and the potential to 
deny, disrupt or destroy a satellite in orbit with little or no risk of attribution 
should be a cause for concern to all space-faring nations.  For the US, it 
represents the clearest possible threat to the asymmetric advantage it enjoys 
in space.  This potential environmental threat to US space dominance 
reinforces the US National Security Space Office Director’s goal of developing 
a SSA, of sufficient fidelity, to be able to detect and track such objects and 
negate the ability of a potential adversary to use micro-satellites for hostile 
purposes, without significantly greater risk of attribution and consequent 
retaliation.   
                                            
127 Major General James Armor, Director, National Security Space Organisation, in discussion 
with the author, 12 June 2007. 
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It is reported that an ‘architectural concept’ for fielding passive electro-
optic sensors on all spacecraft is being considered by the US in an effort to 
add to an awareness of objects in space to detect the approach of another 
satellite, assess any damage and determine the cause of the damage and 
whether it was accidentally inflicted from micro-debris or from more sinister 
causes such as laser or a high-powered microwave weapon128.  A kinetic 
response in space to any attack on a US satellite is highly unlikely because of 
the collateral threat posed by the additional debris generated in the attack.  
The recent Chinese ASAT test is reputed to have generated over 35,000 
pieces of orbital debris, much of which will take several decades to descend 
far enough to be burned up as they enter the Earth’s atmosphere129.  This 
recent example illustrates the potential danger to the constellations of US 
national assets and those of allies and of the commercial satellites on which 
the US and others rely. 
 
The environmental challenge posed by the increasing volume of debris 
in the militarily critical low earth orbits, the proliferation of space-faring nations 
and sub-state actors is of concern.  Add to this the demonstration of China’s 
anti-satellite capability coupled with the potential for manoeuvring small 
satellites exhibited by SNAP-1 and the US nervousness about protecting its 
dominant space capability is understandable.  With rising great space powers 
such as China directly challenging US leadership, the self-imposed 
                                            
128 Amy Butler, Milspace: Space Control Sees Small Piece of the Air Force’s White Budget, 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, (12 February, 2007), p27. 
129 Dr James Clay Moltz, Charting a Course for Improved US Space Security, submission to 
the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 23 
May 2007, p2. 
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constriction of the US commercial capability, the rising demand for more 
formal treaties to govern activity in space and the physical threat from debris 
and a proliferation of space-farers, the US should be concerned that its lead is 
being challenged on many fronts.  The US only perceives those challenges, 
such as the one from China, where there is relevant experience to draw upon 
such as the challenges America faced during the Cold War.  The commercial 
challenges are recognised by many in the space community but the US is 
unable to overcome some entrenched views in Congress.  The legal 
challenges reflect a growing sense that greater governance is required to 
manage the proliferation of space-faring actors.  Finally the environment is the 
most direct and most immediate challenge but one the US, outside the space-
community, seem oblivious to.  Each challenge is significant but in sum 
produce a broad front that the US is blind to, does not have the resources to 
deal with, or is incoherent in its strategy.  In short, to successfully tackle all 
these challenges, they must be treated holistically.   
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CONCLUSION 
The earth orbiting satellite has become the first tool of the human race that is 
not limited by the fuel it can carry, the boundaries of other nations, or by the 
earth’s atmosphere or its oceans.  The fact that it can work for any nation over 
which it passes is a symbol of a great society of the world, and, perhaps more 




The US has risen to its dominant position as the space hegemon with 
few challenges.  Those challenges it has faced it has overcome with a degree 
of panache and has certainly proved to be a ‘beacon’ for the world to follow.  
That the US was able to rise to these challenges is testament to the character 
and resilience of the American nation.  De Tocqueville captured some of 
these strengths in his commentary, recognising the resolve and capability of 
Americans to drive ahead when goals could clearly be seen and not doubting 
their ability to meet an external threat131.  But just as De Tocqueville could not 
assay what would happen when no crisis existed and the issues were 
complex and removed from their day-to-day needs of the American people, so 
the challenges the US face in space today are evident but not focused sharply 
enough to be seen as a crisis.  They also fall into the shadow of the glaring 
challenges faced by Islamic terrorism and the insurgency in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  That said, if the challenges faced in space are not tackled, the 
US could find itself undermined militarily, technologically and economically. 
 
                                            
130 James Webb, Letter to the President, (30 November 1964), HST Library, Webb Papers, 
Box 36. 
131 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (Oxford University Press, 1947), pp116-139, 
cited in James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The Large Scale Approach, (McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1969), p19. 
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To the outside world the apparent rhythm of the early Space Race was 
set by the Soviets.  They gained prestige in the eyes of the world with the first 
satellite to orbit the Earth and reinforced this prestige by putting the first man 
in space.  These headline grabbing achievements also provided credibility to 
the missile capability claims made by Khrushchev.  The missile bluff was 
subsequently revealed as a key tenet of the Soviet policy of brinkmanship 
which was described in the secret ‘meniscus’ speech of 8 January 1962 to 
hide the fact that the Soviet Union was by far the weaker superpower132.  The 
bluff was threatened by US spy planes and in particular by the potential ability 
of satellites to see deep inside the Soviet Union.  This potential surveillance of 
the heart of Soviet territory resulted in the hard line in the UN regarding 
satellite overflight but also fuelled the necessity for the US to ‘catch up’ and 
eventually overtake the Soviet perceived lead in space.  Ultimately, the policy 
Khrushchev adopted enabled the Soviets to survive the early days of the Cold 
War but because of its costs and provocative spur to the US, it was to sow the 
seeds of their eventual downfall.  The US was duped into a race in which 
many commentators believe they were already comfortably in the lead.  The 
US unequivocally captured the lead with their victory in the Space Race and 
they have successfully retained that lead – materially, perceptually and 
ideologically.  Now firmly established at the front of the pack, the prospect of 
the pack gathering and beginning to chase down the American space 
leviathan is becoming a prospect that seems increasingly close.  The US 
confidence in their space leadership is well-founded but perhaps the lead they 
have is not as strong as they believe.   
                                            
132 Aleksander Fursenko and Timoth Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, (W. W. Norton & 
Company, New York, 2006), p5. 
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There are some enlightened and very knowledgeable US space 
experts who are becoming increasingly concerned about the US reliance on 
space for critical parts of the national security and economic infrastructure.  
The most recently issued National Space Policy documents have recognized 
the critical importance space plays in national security.  In 1989 the policy 
claimed that “United States pre-eminence in the key areas of space activity is 
critical to achieving our national security, scientific, technical, economic, and 
foreign policy goals”133 and in 1996 that “space is central for preserving peace 
and protecting US national security”134.  Most recently, in 2006, the Policy 
stated that “to enhance national security, the United States must have robust, 
effective and efficient space capabilities.”135 But each administration has 
stopped short of delivering the budget required to meet the challenges faced.  
When the US Director of the National Security Space Office was asked 
whether, under these circumstances, the US would retain its leadership in 
space; he paused and answered “no”.  Asked who he thought may replace 
America as the leader in space, he replied without hesitation: “China”136.   
 
A remarkably candid statement by such a knowledgeable and well 
respected Pentagon authority was surprising but it also reflected a degree of 
pragmatism and perhaps a shift in the perception of space and its association 
                                            
133 George H. W, Bush, NSPD-30 (NSPD-1), National Space Policy, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection (File: 012605), 2 November 1989, p1. 
134 Office of the Press Secretary. PDD/NSC-49 (PDD/NSTC-8), National Space Policy, 19 
September 1996, p1. 
135George W. Bush, National Space Policy, 31 August 2006, p1. 
http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf  
136 Major General James Armor, Director, National Security Space Organisation, in discussion 
with the author, 12 June 2007. 
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with technological pre-eminence.  The ‘global war on terror’ is consuming 
huge portions of the US budget and many areas, space included, are 
suffering as a consequence.  This represents the pragmatic reason why 
space is not receiving the funds necessary to meet the policy objectives 
desired and the rising challenge posed by states such as China.  It also 
reflects the priority space has in terms of what is critical to the nation at the 
moment.  Just as winning the Space Race was seen in the wider context of its 
impact on the Cold War, so overcoming the challenge thrown down by 
international terrorism is rightly seen as the critical threat to the authority and 
security of America today.  Whilst the view expressed is pragmatic, it fails to 
recognise that the loss of the space capability that the US heavily depends on 
in the fight against terrorism could lead to a critical undermining of the US 
asymmetric technological advantage that enables it to prosecute the fight so 
effectively.  Consequently, it would be short-sighted to ignore the challenges 
faced in space and the threats posed.  Space continues to be vital to enabling 
much of the technology used to fight terrorism and it also continues to fire the 
imagination of millions of people137.  Whilst the engineering has become less 
breathtaking138, the idea of space and the sense of wonder and drive to 
explore it remain as exciting today as they were half a century ago.  However, 
in terms of technological advances that an ambitious nation would want to be 
pre-eminent in, it is perhaps the fields of nanotechnology and genetics that 
will carry the scientific prestige that demands technological leadership.  This 
                                            
137 The space tourism industry is burgeoning and Virgin Galactic is at the forefront, offering a 
trip into space to experience true weightlessness, a view of the earth from above the 
atmosphere and returning to Earth in time for cocktails, all for around £100,000 per person.  
There is no shortage of customers. 
138 The ability to view ‘on the spot’ reports on CNN via satellite link from the other side of the 
world when we watch the news barely registers as a technological feat. 
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opinion was reflected in a recent Economist leader article which identified 
biological breakthroughs in RNA as being as important as any previous 
scientific breakthroughs in physics139.  They will certainly play an important 
part in how the world develops but whether they will carry the kudos of space 
leadership is not clear.  Furthermore, even though Pentagon insiders may be 
questioning the national commitment to space, the reality of space as a future 
military domain is not in question.  
 
In the most recent US Quadrennial Defense Review, the vision for 
space was to: 
Continue to enjoy an advantage in space capabilities across all mission 
areas.  This advantage will be maintained by staying at least one 
technology generation ahead of any foreign or commercial space 
power140.   
 
It is clear from this that the US desire to stay in the lead in space but it is 
equally clear that they are facing challenges on a number of fronts both 
domestically and internationally that make sustaining the lead they have 
increasingly difficult.  There is growing evidence to suggest that the US lead is 
being eroded by rising space-faring nations such as China, by emerging 
alternative commercial space markets and by the demand to govern the 
exploitation of the space environment.  In parallel, there seems to be little 
evidence to suggest that the US have acknowledged the holistic nature of the 
many challenges they face.   
 
                                            
139 The Economist, Biology’s Big Bang, (Vol. 383, No. 8533, 16-22 June 2007), p13. 
140 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (6 February, 2006), 
p.55. 
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 Whilst many believed that the Soviets had created a missile gap in the 
original space race, they did not actually lead in any meaningful category of 
missile technology.  The view constructed by the man in the street, fed by a 
misinformed media, was the all important perception and one that the US had 
to fight hard and commit billions of dollars to overcome with the Apollo moon 
launches.  Today, the US is perceived to have the clear lead in space 
technology and in many areas they do.  This lead is fast being eroded by the 
more agile and innovative space industry growing outside the US and the 
more committed Chinese space programme.  If they are not careful today, the 
constructed perception bubble that keeps the US comfortably assuming 
dominance in space may burst and they will find themselves faced with a 
decision over whether being first in space really does mean what it used to do 
for national prestige.   
 
The first Space Race was entered into against an identified adversary 
who had succeeded in capturing the imagination of the world with the launch 
of Sputnik I, giving credibility to their ambitious technological claims which 
directly challenged US security.  The need for a US response was clear and 
that response was captured by President Kennedy in his special message to 
the Congress on urgent national needs on 25 May 1961.  The goal of sending 
a man to the moon and safely returning him to earth was embraced by 
Washington and the whole of America and was used as a rallying cry to 
demonstrate American virility and technical superiority over the Soviet 
challenger.  It was translated into action by decision-makers shaped by 
common experiences in WWII.  By contrast, the challenges to US dominance 
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in space today are more diffuse.  America demonstrably already has the lead 
in space, leaving little need to respond; and the cohort of decision-makers in 
Washington and the American public at large lack a universal rallying call to 
harness a concerted response to the vague and complex challenges faced.   
 
There is little evidence to suggest that the few voices reporting US 
space vulnerability are being dismissed in a coherent US policy to surrender 
space leadership and the dominance that secures, more it is blindness to the 
extent and potential impact of the challenges faced.  It is possible to draw a 
parallel from historical context.  Geographically protected by two great oceans 
and with benign neighbours, the US rightly believed itself to be secure, 
perhaps even invulnerable from attack and maintained a relatively small 
military and avoided complex, entangling alliances.  Up until 1941 this 
propitious position blinkered the US to many of the implications of 
international anarchy and the associated security dilemma.  The long-held 
leadership in space today represents almost four decades of dominance and 
has generated a similar sense of security and invulnerability that may require 
a discontinuous event such as the sinking of the passenger ship Lusitannia by 
a German U-Boat which provided the catalyst for the US to eventually enter 
the First World War in 1917141.  An attack on an American satellite that was 
attributable to a sovereign state or identifiable non-state actor or, more likely, 
the attempted disruption or denial of the freedom to operate a satellite may be 
the trigger needed for full recognition of the significance of a successful 
challenge to the US leadership and dominance enjoyed in space. 
                                            
141 The British liner Lusitania was sunk in 1915 by a German U-Boat, killing 128 Americans.  
This proved to be the catalyst for America to abandon its tenuous position of neutrality and 
enter the war on the side of the allies.   
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The space sector of military, security and economic activity is an area 
with high technological and financial risks and requires strategic investment 
decisions.  The US has traditionally been bold and confident, taking on the 
technological risks and making the necessary investments.  Its confidence is 
beginning to ebb as it sees threats and tries to protect its riches of knowledge 
and experience of space harvested over the last 50 years.  It is now risk 
averse and is avoiding the strategic investment necessary to secure its role as 
the world leader in space and in the technology used to achieve it.  That the 
Space Race is over and the Space Age is temporarily ignored seems 
disappointingly apparent.  That it will be revived in the future seems inevitable 
– the desire for challenge and exploration and the need to satisfy our 
seemingly insatiable appetite requires vast new resources.  The future of 
humanity is in the stars and the benign leadership of Pax Americana offers 
the brightest option for successfully meeting this future.  Embracing 
cooperation, opening up its technology and markets to free competition to 
promote the spread of liberal democratic exploration of the final frontier is a 
tantalising prospect. 
 
The US sense of itself in terms of exceptionalism and as a ‘beacon’ for 
the world to follow has served it well.  The unchallenged dominance has seen 
the US spread its influence militarily, politically, economically and culturally.  
This influence has been no less dominant in space.  Unchallenged since the 
Cold War and able to influence the terms of development of other space-
faring actors, the US has sat comfortably in control in space.  That dominance 
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is now reaching the point at which it is beyond the resources or influence of 
the US to dominate as it has previously done.  More assertive but with less 
influence, the US dominance in space is being challenged on a number of 
fronts.  None of the challenges comprise particularly pernicious threats but 
they all have the potential to be misinterpreted as being more malevolent.  
The peaceful use of space was the goal of Eisenhower and has been the 
avowed aim of all space-faring nations.  To ensure that this happens, dialogue 
with China should be undertaken to avoid misunderstanding, the ITAR 
straightjacket should be loosened, free-ranging discussions on governance 
and management of space debris should be complete the agenda that the US 
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